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Cities, Inclusion and Exactions 
Audrey G. McFarlane* & Randall K. Johnson** 
ABSTRACT: Cities across the country are adopting mandatory inclusionary 
zoning. Yet, consensus about the appropriate constitutional standard to 
measure the propriety of mandatory inclusionary zoning has not been fully 
reached. Under one doctrinal lens, inclusionary zoning is a valid land use 
regulation adopted to ensure a proper balance of housing within the 
jurisdiction. Under another doctrinal lens, challengers seek to characterize 
inclusionary zoning as an exaction, a discretionary condition subject to a 
heightened standard of review addressing the specific negative impact caused 
by an individual project on the supply of affordable housing in a jurisdiction. 
Drawing from the experience of Baltimore, Maryland’s inclusionary zoning 
ordinance, this Article considers the impact that the uncertainty in the law 
may have had on the type of inclusionary zoning ordinance adopted by the 
city. This Article argues that the conversation about inclusionary zoning, 
land use regulation, and exactions has been formulated in the context of 
imagery about development that leaves places like Baltimore out. The imagery 
in these narratives is of an individual landowner powerless in the face of 
government overreach. The reality is different in those places where land 
developers are not powerless and instead are often politically influential repeat 
players. Thus, the real problem presented may be not how to craft doctrine to 
prevent cities from asking too much of developers, but instead to craft doctrine 
that ensures cities do not give away too much. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The project of addressing the need for affordable housing in the United 
States presents an ongoing dilemma for local government: how to pay for the 
construction of affordable housing units; and how to find geographic 
locations to build such units without local opposition thwarting the projects, 
reconcentrating poverty, or perpetuating racial segregation. These endeavors 
are a work in progress, and inclusionary zoning has become an increasingly 
popular, but partial, solution.1 Under an inclusionary zoning approach, a 
local government zoning or related housing law will either encourage or 
require a developer who proposes a new residential construction project to 
“set aside” a certain number of units for income-restricted sale or lease.2 This 
 
 1. See Jenny Schuetz et al., 31 Flavors of Inclusionary Zoning: Comparing Policies from San 
Francisco, Washington, D.C. and Suburban Boston 1 (Furman Ctr. for Real Estate & Urban Policy, 
Working Paper No. 08–02, 2008), http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/31flavorsofIZ9-
9-08.pdf (“As housing costs have risen in the U.S. and federal subsidies for affordable housing 
programs have declined, inclusionary zoning . . . has become an increasingly popular local policy 
for producing low-income housing without direct public subsidy.”). 
 2. See generally Robert Hickey et al., Achieving Lasting Affordability Through Inclusionary Housing 
(Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy, Working Paper No. 14RH1, 2014), http://www.lincolninst.edu/ 
sites/default/files/pubfiles/achieving-lasting-affordability-through-inclusionary-housing-full.pdf 
(analyzing a set of twenty inclusionary housing programs). 
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approach encourages the private production of new affordable housing that 
is geographically and economically integrated.3 
Although increasingly widespread, the propriety of inclusionary zoning 
under the U.S. constitutional doctrine that governs local land use and 
individual property rights is still somewhat unsettled; the way in which the 
rights and governmental exercise of authority are framed shapes different 
answers to whether an inclusionary zoning ordinance is valid.4 This ambiguity 
presents two unresolved questions. The first question is whether private 
developers, by being asked to include units of low- to moderate-income 
housing in market-rate developments, are being asked to do something 
extraordinary that unfairly impinges on their property rights—especially 
when it is costly, either financially or in terms of the upscale image or message 
that a developer wants to sell.5 The second question is whether developers are 
asked to do something both ordinary and consistent with land use regulation 
because inclusionary zoning promotes uses of land that improves the general 
welfare of the populace by ensuring housing types that meet the variety of 
residents’ needs. Tailoring housing types to differing abilities to pay is 
particularly appropriate considering land use regulation’s history of 
exclusionary zoning and its pernicious effect in facilitating segregation.6 
For the most part, there have been relatively few successful challenges to 
inclusionary zoning ordinances.7 This is likely so because developers have still 
found it lucrative to fulfill inclusionary zoning requirements and build 
profitable residential developments.8 Some developers even consider it the 
right thing to do.9 Also, local governments have mostly been careful in 
 
 3. Id. at 1.  
 4. Tim Iglesias, Framing Inclusionary Zoning: Exploring the Legality of Local Inclusionary Zoning 
and Its Potential to Meet Affordable Housing Needs, ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., Apr. 2013, at 1, 4 (arguing 
that the way the ordinance is framed, as an ordinary land use regulation or a permit with 
conditions, affects state courts’ receptiveness to either uphold or strike down inclusionary zoning 
ordinances). 
 5. See Is Inclusionary Housing the New Normal for High-Cost Places?, HOW HOUSING MATTERS 
(Mar. 5, 2015), http://howhousingmatters.org/articles/is-inclusionary-housing-new-normal-high-
cost-places (“Courts have overturned inclusionary zoning ordinances in some communities, 
ruling that they are illegal forms of rent control.”). 
 6. See John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 91, 91 (2014) 
(“Decades of scholarship—legal and sociological—outline how [zoning] policies left low-income 
families stranded in faltering cities whose abandonment by suburban homeowners-to-be at least 
left behind a large supply of low-cost housing.”). 
 7. See Iglesias, supra note 4, at 7–9 (describing the various types of legal challenges to 
inclusionary zoning ordinances, few of which have been successful). 
 8. See Nicholas J. Brunick, Inclusionary Housing: Proven Success in Large Cities, ZONING PRAC., 
Oct. 2004, at 1, 3 (finding, in one city, that “[n]ew housing development continues to boom . . . 
and development projects remain lucrative, even with the affordable unit set-aside requirement”). 
 9. See URBAN INST., EXPANDING HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH INCLUSIONARY 
ZONING: LESSONS FROM TWO COUNTIES 18 (2012) (“Because [Moderately Priced Dwelling Units 
(“MPDU”)] are required in nearly all developments and subdivisions in Montgomery County, 
developers think it is fair.” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 24 (“Some developers have even 
expressed pride in their involvement with the MPDU program. They agree that MPDUs are 
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designing these ordinances to avoid political upset, or worse—legal 
challenges.10 As a result, either market-rate housing with inclusionary units 
has been profitably produced notwithstanding the inclusionary zoning 
requirements, or developers have been insulated from foregone rent or sale 
income by a combination of strong real estate markets and packages of cost 
offsets, such as density bonuses or other forms of subsidy.11 
Despite the absence of challenges, the experience of a midsized city like 
Baltimore, Maryland shows a need to consider the extent to which takings law 
demands that developers must be subsidized to produce inclusionary housing 
units. Baltimore’s mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinance was deliberately 
written to only apply if the city completely financially reimburses the 
developer for creating new affordable housing.12 The assumption is that each 
developer is required to be made whole for every affordable unit that is 
created, sold, and rented at the city’s behest.13 The result has been an 
inclusionary ordinance that has produced very few affordable housing units.14 
This Article uses Baltimore’s ordinance to illustrate the impact that the 
unsettled questions quietly surrounding inclusionary zoning may have, in 
particular the uncertainty about whether and how the existing constitutional 
framework governing land use regulation applies to mandatory inclusionary 
zoning. The hybrid combination of Due Process, takings, and exactions 
doctrines that guides the analysis of this regulation means the constitutional 
inquiry is framed in terms of a rigid binary: whether, under Due Process and 
takings analysis that has traditionally been applied to zoning, inclusionary 
zoning is subject to the traditional deferential standard of judicial review that 
 
valuable and they enjoy the challenge of making development profitable and MPDUs compatible 
with the market-rate units.”). 
 10. See Is Inclusionary Housing Legal?, INCLUSIONARY HOUSING, http://inclusionaryhousing.org/ 
inclusionary-housing-explained/what-are-the-downsides/is-it-legal (last visited Apr. 23, 2017) 
(“Policymakers interested in adopting inclusionary housing policies must work closely with legal 
counsel to design a program that anticipates potential challenges under federal or state law.”). 
 11. As one developer explained: “Oftentimes, in the location that we’re building, the differential 
between market and set-aside doesn’t really affect our bottom line . . . . Truthfully, it’s almost beneficial 
to us because, oftentimes, to have that additional density is meaningful to us from a dollars perspective.” 
Kim Slowey, Affordable Housing on the Hot Seat: Changing Regulations ‘Force Developers to be More Creative’, 
CONSTRUCTION DIVE (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.constructiondive.com/news/affordable-housing-
on-the-hot-seat-changing-regulations-force-developers/415335. But see Nicholas Benson, Note, A Tale 
of Two Cities: Examining the Success of Inclusionary Zoning Ordinances in Montgomery County, Maryland and 
Boulder, Colorado, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 753, 771 (2010) (noting that Boulder, Colorado’s 
mandatory inclusionary housing ordinance does not make density bonuses available to developers). 
 12. See BALT., MD. CODE art. 13, §§ 2B-1 to -72 (2016) (establishing the requirements of 
Baltimore’s inclusionary housing program). 
 13. See id. § 2B-4(d), (f) (“This subtitle is not intended to impose additional financial 
burdens on a developer or a residential project. Rather, the intent of this subtitle is that the cost 
offsets and other incentives authorized under it will fully offset any financial impact resulting 
from the inclusionary requirements imposed.”). 
 14. See Natalie Sherman, Despite Rule, Few Affordable Units Created in New Developments, BALT. SUN 
(Dec. 27, 2014, 11:45 AM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/sun-investigates/bs-
bz-inclusionary-housing-20141227-story.html. 
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applies to exercises of the police power,15 or whether a more probing standard 
of review should apply under exactions doctrine because a developer is being 
required to construct a type of unit that is rented or sold at a below-market 
rate as a condition of being allowed to build.16 As a result of this binary, one 
set of legal doctrine defers mightily to local government while the other set 
protects developers whenever the perception is that a local government is 
overreaching.17 
The original framework for land use regulation was conceived when 
zoning was considered a static affair of defining districts that prescribe land 
uses. Since then zoning has grappled with accounting for new understandings 
about the public–private interplay in getting development built as well as the 
benefits and costs of new development.18 Not considered relevant to the 
analysis are other factors that affect the outcomes of development and 
broader normative questions about how much development should be 
considered to be already subsidized by the public—for example, an irrelevant 
factor is the broader impact of the tendency to build upscale, expensive 
housing.19 The fundamental issue may instead be whether developers have 
been adequately required to account for the true cost that a project represents 
to the public in economic, political, and social terms. 
In particular, exactions doctrine, the more restrictive end of the land use 
constitutional legal framework, is inappropriately conceptualized to take into 
account the realities and experiences of places that are unlike the locations 
where the doctrine was largely conceived and formulated.20 Under exactions 
doctrine, a local government is prohibited from imposing conditions on 
landowners seeking permission to intensify the use of their land through 
development that are found not to relate directly to a specific impact of the 
 
 15. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31–33 (1954) (describing judicial deference to the 
police power). 
 16. See Iglesias, supra note 4, at 4 (discussing how the framing of the inclusionary zoning 
issue can affect the legal analysis). 
 17. Id. at 6–8; see also Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow: The 
Institutional Contexts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 730–31 (2007) (describing exactions as a 
“confusing line of takings decisions”). 
 18. See Andrew Auchincloss Lundgren, Beyond Zoning: Dynamic Land Use Planning in the Age 
of Sprawl, 11 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 101, 137–38 (2004) (“Instead of a static, use-based planning 
medium—-one which is based solely on the prerogative of the local governmental body—a . . . 
new strategy . . . must rather build upon its foundation and be capable of addressing the needs 
of developer, resident, neighborhood, and landscape. In short, the next step in land use planning 
will require a dynamism not seen in the previous regimes of nuisance and contract at common 
law, nor in the regulatory geometry of Euclidian zoning and its offspring.”); see also ROBERT C. 
ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS 332 (4th ed. 2013). 
 19. See Bethany Y. Li, Now Is the Time!: Challenging Resegregation and Displacement in the Age of 
Hypergentrification, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1189, 1190–91 (2016) (explaining how luxury 
development leads to the negative impact of displacement of low-income residents and in places 
like New York City is leading to extreme or hypergentrification displacing middle-and-upper-
income residents). 
 20. See Saskia Sassen, The Global City: Introducing a Concept, 11 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 27, 27 
(2005) (describing the fact that major cities, as opposed to nation-states, may be the most 
important regulators of economic activity). 
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proposed development.21 As this Article demonstrates, exactions doctrine 
reflects a particular narrative that may not be applicable to different 
development settings. This is especially true for U.S. cities in crisis that are 
trying to find their footing in a postindustrial world, rely heavily on real estate 
development, and are very hospitable to real estate developers.22 This is in 
sharp contrast to the exactions narrative arc, which accepts as true a story that 
overbearing governments take advantage of defenseless property owners.23 As 
a result, exactions doctrine reflects exaggerated concerns about government 
overreach, even where developers have a privileged voice and receive ample 
direct and indirect government subsidies to get even modest improvement 
projects off the ground.24 
This Article argues that the failure to fully describe the relationship 
between developers, local governments, and the general public has 
detrimentally decontextualized exactions doctrine. In many instances, 
developers try to improve the value of their real property by encouraging local 
governments to make investments in public goods and services. The general 
public is often completely unaware that developers are being subsidized in 
the process. Far from being victims of overbearing local governments, 
developers are politically savvy citizens who take advantage of public goods.25 
Also, the stories on which exactions doctrine is based ignore the not 
uncommon reality that local governments may respond meekly in the face of 
opposition. Therefore, adding the story of how a struggling city actually 
responds to developers may help to illuminate the inadequacies of the current 
framework for much-needed mandatory inclusionary zoning. 
Within this context of ever-present direct and indirect subsidy, this 
Article focuses on an underappreciated question: How can local governments 
regulate the wide variety of development projects without giving away too 
 
 21. See Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the Consequences 
of Clarity, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 609, 613 (2004) (“Exactions include mandatory dedications of land, 
fees required in lieu of dedication, and impact fees given by property owners in exchange for 
permits, zoning changes, and other regulatory clearances.”). 
 22. See Randall K. Johnson, How the United States Postal Service (USPS) Could Encourage More 
Local Economic Development, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (describing the economic 
difficulties that are faced by certain local governments in the United States, as well as one way 
that these cities in crisis could generate more revenue). 
 23. See Daniel P. Selmi, Takings and Extortion, 68 FLA. L. REV. 323, 336 (2016) (“Professor 
Gregory Alexander described the early exaction cases as a story of ‘power and fear,’ one about a 
‘perceived imbalance of power’ between private landowners and government regulators. He 
suggested that courts were not generating takings law by a ‘methodological or theoretical 
concern, but by the pictures that judges have in their heads about the participants in the public 
land-use planning arena.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Gregory S. Alexander, Takings, 
Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1752–53 (1988))).  
 24. See DAVID L. IMBROSCIO, RECONSTRUCTING CITY POLITICS: ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AND URBAN REGIMES 10–12 (1997) (discussing the relationship between “local 
officials and land-based business interests,” which varies from place to place but is systemic). 
 25. See generally Selmi, supra note 23 (arguing that the “extortion narrative” used to support 
the takings doctrine is not justified). 
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much—i.e., without oversubsidizing?26 Part II discusses the goals and methods 
of inclusionary zoning ordinances and the range of ways to incentivize private 
sector production of affordable housing. Part III discusses the indeterminate 
positioning of mandatory inclusionary zoning between traditional land use 
regulation and exactions doctrine and argues that the traditional land use 
framework is still the most appropriate lens for inclusionary zoning. But this 
Article also argues that, even if an exactions framework is applied, the ways in 
which local governments bestow value on developers should be taken into 
account by courts. Under that circumstance, Part IV identifies a potential 
framework under an exactions analysis for evaluating mandatory inclusionary 
zoning ordinances. 
II. INCLUSIONARY ZONING 
A. HOW ZONING SHAPED THE NEED FOR INCLUSIONARY ZONING 
Zoning, as the predominant form of land use regulation, has enjoyed 
broad deference from state and federal courts since its approval in Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.27 The assumption at the heart of this approval was 
that, through zoning, government can regulate both compatibility—by 
keeping incompatible uses of land separate—and exclusion—for example, by 
keeping certain commercial ventures that may imperil a citizen’s health 
separate from residential neighborhoods.28 As history has demonstrated, 
however, incompatible uses have long been interpreted to include the types 
of activities taking place on a parcel of land, as well as the types of people who 
are allowed to engage in such activities.29 
Thus, zoning has embedded within its framework the legal right for local 
governments to favor particular classes of land use through what was, in effect, 
a form of direct subsidization and disfavor others through exclusion. In other 
words, local governments protect the more expensive and higher-class single-
family homes, which creates scarcity that adds economic value,30 and, as a 
result, absorbs a hidden cost of excluding the more affordable and lower-class 
 
 26. Cf. William Fulton, To Subsidize Development or Not?, GOVERNING (Aug. 2016), http://www. 
governing.com/columns/urban-notebook/gov-economic-development-subsidize.html (describing 
the flawed decision-making calculus of certain locally elected officials). 
 27. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (holding that zoning 
is a valid exercise of the police power). 
 28. See generally Spur Indus. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972) (en banc) 
(describing two potentially incompatible uses, a cement plant and a residential neighborhood); 
Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970) (examining the uses of a feedlot and a 
residential neighborhood). 
 29. See BERYL SATTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES: RACE, REAL ESTATE, AND THE EXPLOITATION OF 
BLACK URBAN AMERICA 4 (2009) (describing how “across the nation, most banks and savings and 
loans refused to make mortgage loans to African Americans, in part because of the policies of the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which ‘redlined’—that is, refused to insure mortgages—
in neighborhoods that contained more than a smattering of black residents”). 
 30. See generally ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING 
NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT (2012) (examining different ways to look at neighborhoods as social 
structures). 
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multifamily housing.31 This mostly overlooked regulatory right to exclude 
certain types of housing from a neighborhood silently undergirds the 
definition of ordinary land use regulations as good management of a local 
jurisdiction’s land use for the general benefit of the public.32 As such, the 
disadvantages that were imposed upon a segment of the local population and 
the distortions that arose33 in terms of the housing types produced by this 
“free” market, were normalized and zoning has been recognized as an 
efficient, politically popular, and constitutional practice since 1926.34 
A separate, yet related, endeavor has been how to encourage the 
production of additional units of housing by government and private 
industry.35 In a series of experiments going back to the days of the public land 
grant program and during the Great Depression with the formation of the 
Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (“HOLC”),36 the federal government has 
largely shaped and facilitated (some would argue, created) a housing 
production machine by making financing available to Americans of modest 
 
 31. See Edward Glaeser et al., How Large Lot Zoning and Other Town Regulations Are Driving Up Home 
Prices, COMMONWEALTH (Jan. 1, 2006), http://commonwealthmagazine.org/uncategorized/how-
large-lot-zoning-and-other-town-regulations-are-driving-up-home-prices (“While minimum lot size is 
one way of managing development, communities have adopted a wide range of other controls that 
limit growth. The most direct approach is a growth cap, which limits the number of new units that can 
be built during a given year; a variant is a phasing schedule that limits the pace of [unit] construction 
within a single subdivision. Such regulations have become more common in the last decade.”). 
 32. See EDWARD C. BANFIELD & MORTON GRODZINS, GOVERNMENT AND HOUSING IN 
METROPOLITAN AREAS 71–92 (1958) (discussing the wisdom of economic segregation); Richard 
F. Babcock & Fred P. Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 1040, 
1048 (1963); Norman Williams, Jr., Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
317, 343–48 (1955) (discussing the constitutionality of economic segregation). 
 33. See generally Christopher Serkin & Leslie Wellington, Putting Exclusionary Zoning in Its 
Place: Affordable Housing and Geographical Scale, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1667 (2013) (discussing the 
local and regional impact of exclusionary zoning on the supply of affordable housing). 
 34. See GUY STUART, DISCRIMINATING RISK: THE U.S. MORTGAGE LENDING INDUSTRY IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 206 (2003); Audrey G. McFarlane, The Properties of Instability: Markets, Predation, 
Racialized Geography, and Property Law, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 855, 911 (“This overall racialized landscape 
has been created through legal and extra-legal devices to shape geographical reality and limit 
behavior to racialized geographic patterns, such as racially restrictive covenants and government-
sponsored racially exclusionary redlining. It has been maintained by land use and zoning rules that 
unquestioningly ratify the exclusion of multi-family housing to protect middle- and upper-class 
homeowners and [to] promote environmental racism through expulsive zoning, locating 
undeserving or hazardous uses in and near Black communities.” (footnote omitted)). 
 35. See Josh Barro, Affordable Housing That’s Very Costly, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (June 7, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/08/upshot/affordable-housing-thats-very-costly.html 
(describing developers’ reluctance to participate in a voluntary inclusionary zoning program). 
 36. See Alan S. Blinder, From the New Deal, a Way Out of a Mess, N.Y. TIMES: BUS. DAY (Feb. 24, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/business/24view.html (“The HOLC was established in 
June 1933 to help distressed families avert foreclosures by replacing mortgages that were in or near 
default with new ones that homeowners could afford. . . . Nearly one of every five mortgages in America 
became owned by the HOLC. Its total lending over its lifetime amounted to $3.5 billion . . . . The 
HOLC closed its books in 1951, or 15 years after its last 1936 mortgage was paid off, with a small 
profit.”). 
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means,37 making the mortgage interest tax deduction widely available,38 
providing subsidies for publicly- or privately-owned housing projects,39 and 
later providing voucher subsidies that follow the individual rather than the 
project.40 The recent trend away from publicly-financed housing projects has, 
in effect, privatized traditional housing subsidies. The government has done 
so in the low-income housing arena by awarding housing vouchers—i.e., a 
direct subsidy to a small subset of renters and tax deductions to all 
homeowners with mortgages.41 In addition, the redlining and other market 
failures that were embedded in government’s sponsoring and incentivizing 
housing production has left the United States with a legacy of racial and 
economic segregation that the nation still struggles with to this day.42 
The geographic location of this privatized yet subsidized housing 
construction was shaped by ordinary land use regulation.43 Thus, housing 
 
 37. Thomas W. Hanchett, The Other “Subsidized Housing”: Federal Aid to Suburbanization, 
1940s–1960s, in FROM TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR HOMES: IN SEARCH OF AN URBAN HOUSING 
POLICY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 163, 171–73 (John F. Bauman et al. eds., 2000). See 
generally ROSALYN BAXANDALL & ELIZABETH EWEN, PICTURE WINDOWS: HOW THE SUBURBS 
HAPPENED (2000) (analyzing the history of suburbs); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: 
THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985) (same). 
 38. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR TAX EXPENDITURES IN THE 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM 17 (2013) (finding that the mortgage interest tax deduction 
primarily benefits the top fifth of income earners). 
 39. See Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and 
Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-389, 106 Stat. 1571 (1992) 
(creating the Hope VI Program “Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere,” 
which provided grant funding for public housing redevelopment); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. 
L. No. 99-514, § 252, 100 Stat. 2085, 2189–2208 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 26 U.S.C.) (creating the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (“LIHTC”), the current 
largest federal funding for low income housing development); Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 8, 88 Stat. 633, 662–66 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2006)) (creating the Section 8 program now called the Housing Choice 
Voucher Program); Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). See generally United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 
75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437–39 (2006)). 
 40. See David M.P. Freund, Marketing the Free Market: State Intervention and the Politics of 
Prosperity in Metropolitan America, in THE NEW SUBURBAN HISTORY 11, 14–20 (Kevin M. Kruse & 
Thomas J. Sugrue eds., 2006) (finding that a project-focused approach to development was 
codified in a series of federal laws, so as to underwrite the suburbia that has come to be 
understood as a naturally-produced and market-driven phenomenon). 
 41. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 329, 346–47 
(2009) (“Tax subsidies also benefit higher-income taxpayers because only homeownership is 
encouraged—not housing more generally. . . . [T]ax policies for housing significantly benefit 
higher-income taxpayers. The overwhelming majority of low-income taxpayers who pay mortgage 
interest are not able to receive a tax benefit from homeownership.”); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, 
Cognitive Theory and the Delivery of Welfare Benefits, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 253, 256 (2009) (discussing 
the cognitive reasons that tax deductions and credits are more psychologically appealing than 
direct welfare or benefits payments). 
 42. See generally DAVID M.P. FREUND, COLORED PROPERTY: STATE POLICY AND WHITE RACIAL 
POLITICS IN SUBURBAN AMERICA (2007); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN 
HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017).  
 43. See William A. Fischel, The Evolution of Homeownership, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1503, 1514–15 
(2010) (reviewing LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND 
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construction took two project-focused forms: (1) a suburban-style, 
independently-owned (while invisibly subsidized) form of housing that was 
constructed in the low-density areas outside of central cities; and (2) a rented 
form of the multifamily home, largely segregated by race and income, which 
was confined to central cities and stigmatized as the epitome of subsidized.44 
As a result, ordinary land use regulation has often restricted affordable 
housing opportunities to locations that are racialized “black” and resulted in 
an uneven distribution of public sector resources, access to wealth, 
stigmatized reputation, and constrained opportunities for social mobility.45 
Other trends have converged to further revolutionize this project-
focused approach to housing production. For example, affordable housing, 
while stigmatized and often opposed, is generally recognized as necessary to 
the creation of a robust housing market.46 It has also become more accepted 
for government to use zoning to require or encourage private housing 
developers to build a mix of housing types that different segments of the 
population may access, in order to encourage local economic development.47 
Among the results of this convergence is the creation of a land use 
regulatory innovation called inclusionary zoning.48 Beginning with an 
experiment in 1974 in Montgomery County, Maryland,49 inclusionary zoning 
has been used to increase the availability of affordable housing by requiring 
that developers provide below-market units in exchange for a range of 
 
PROPERTY LINES (2009)) (describing zoning’s evolving exclusionary role in middle- and upper-
income suburbs, beginning first as selectively exclusionary of among other things “were hostile 
to junkyards, heavy industry, high-rise apartments, low-income housing, and halfway houses” to 
becoming generally exclusionary as movements to “open the suburbs” gained momentum and 
the poor became increasingly mobile). 
 44. See generally PUBLIC HOUSING MYTHS: PERCEPTION, REALITY, AND SOCIAL POLICY 
(Nicholas Dagen Bloom et al. eds., 2015). 
 45. See generally LAWRENCE J. VALE, RECLAIMING PUBLIC HOUSING: A HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE 
IN THREE PUBLIC NEIGHBORHOODS (2002) (comparing three public housing projects in Boston). 
 46. See generally S. Leonard Syme & Miranda L. Ritterman, The Importance of Community 
Development for Health and Well-Being, COMMUNITY DEV. INVESTMENT REV., Dec. 2009, at 1 
(discussing the importance of community development to individual well-being and economic 
health of a community); Lawrence J. Vale et al., What Affordable Housing Should Afford: Housing for 
Resilient Cities, CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES., 2014 No. 2, at 21 (arguing that affordable housing 
is essential to a resilient city). 
 47. Abigail Savitch-Lew, Skeptics Say City’s Environmental Studies Understate Damage from 
Development, CITY LIMITS (Sept. 26, 2016), http://citylimits.org/2016/09/26/skeptics-say-citys-
enviro-studies-understate-damage-from-development (finding that “many advocates deride the 
environmental review process and accuse it of shielding developers and city planning agencies 
from lawsuits while failing to protect neighborhoods from the negative effects of development”). 
 48. See generally TIMOTHY S. HOLLISTER ET AL., NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INCLUSIONARY ZONING 
ORDINANCES 1 (2007) (surveying state inclusionary zoning enabling acts and suggestings ways to 
structure inclusionary zoning ordinances). 
 49. See Jen DeGregorio, Baltimore’s Affordable Housing Rules Follow Model in Montgomery County, 
DAILY REC. (BALT.) (Dec. 8, 2006), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-8981541.html (“When 
the Baltimore City Council considers a bill requiring most developers to include affordable 
housing in new developments, it will not be navigating in uncharted waters. Montgomery County 
has had a similar law for 32 years . . . .”). 
A8_MCFARLANE (DO NOT DELETE) 7/25/2017 11:55 PM 
2017] CITIES, INCLUSION AND EXACTIONS 2155 
different incentives.50 Usually, this regulation is viewed in a positive light since 
it creates units at no direct public cost.51 
B. THE MECHANICS OF INCLUSIONARY ZONING 
Inclusionary zoning ordinances have proliferated across the United 
States in 27 states and the District of Columbia.52 These laws are authorized 
by state zoning enabling statutes53 and are increasingly adopted by 
jurisdictions both large and small.54 These ordinances require that new 
housing developments contain a mix of units with different prices, amenities, 
and layouts.55 In order to redress past exclusionary zoning and other 
government failures, the goal is both affordability and integration based on 
income.56 
1. Mandatory or Voluntary 
While inclusionary zoning ordinances can be mandatory or voluntary, 
the vast majority are required by law.57 Scholars generally agree that the 
 
 50. See Danielle Sweeney, Inclusionary Housing Fund Running on Empty, Advisory Board Told, BALT. 
BREW (Oct. 22, 2014, 6:10 PM), https://www.baltimorebrew.com/2014/10/22/inclusionary-
housing-fund-running-on-empty-advisory-board-told (“The [Baltimore City Mandatory Inclusionary 
Zoning Ordinance] was designed to place no financial burden on the developer or project by requiring 
the city to buy or rent units at market rate and make the units available to individuals who meet certain 
income requirements.”); see also HEATHER L. SCHWARTZ ET AL., RAND CORP., IS INCLUSIONARY ZONING 
INCLUSIONARY? 23 (2012) (“Other common incentives include fee waivers, reductions in parking 
spaces required by zoning and building codes, and expedited permitting.” (citation omitted)). 
 51. See Barro, supra note 35. 
 52. See Hickey et al., supra note 2, at 18. 
 53. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., LAND USE § 7-401(a) (West 2012) (authorizing local legislative 
bodies to impose inclusionary zoning and award density bonuses to promote creation of housing 
affordable to persons of low and moderate income). 
 54. See Sherman, supra note 14 (discussing an inclusionary housing ordinance in the city of 
Baltimore). See generally URBAN INST., supra note 9 (providing an overview of inclusionary zoning 
in two counties). 
 55. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., MIXED-INCOME HOUSING AND THE HOME 
PROGRAM 16 (2003) (“Developers must evaluate and identify the customer’s housing needs in 
terms of ideal unit size, amenities, unit layout, and locational preference.”). 
 56. See CLIFFORD WINSTON, AEI–BROOKINGS JOINT CTR. FOR REGULATORY STUDIES, 
GOVERNMENT FAILURE VERSUS MARKET FAILURE: MICROECONOMICS POLICY RESEARCH AND 
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 2–3 (2006) (“Government failure[s] . . . arise[] when government 
has created inefficiencies because it should not have intervened [in a particular market] in the 
first place or when [that government] could have solved a given problem . . . more efficiently . . . 
by generating greater net benefits.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 57. See HOLLISTER ET AL., supra note 48, at 2. As of 2007, the authors,  
summarize the survey of state law as follows: 
 thirteen states have statutes or regulations that either expressly authorize 
inclusionary zoning (using the actual words “inclusionary zoning”) or 
clearly imply such authority by granting broad powers to promote 
affordable housing (Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode 
Island, Vermont, and Virginia); 
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mandatory ones are the most effective to produce affordable housing units.58 
The features of a typical inclusionary zoning ordinance break down as follows: 
The size of a project triggers the application of the ordinance; this trigger 
leads to the imposition of a set requirement of affordable units; and the 
developer complies with the requirement.59 
2. Which Projects are Subject to Inclusionary Zoning? 
The triggering size for inclusionary zoning can range from as few as two 
units to as many as two hundred.60 According to a study conducted by the 
RAND Corporation, the triggering size of the project will vary based on the 
strength of the local housing market.61 The more expensive the market, the 
less of an impact the requirement will have on the profitability of a 
development.62 Markets with high real estate prices insulate developers from 
the relatively smaller costs of additional inclusionary units.63 
 
 seven states have no express authorization for inclusionary zoning, but 
one or more major municipalities in the state law have adopted 
inclusionary zoning programs (California, Georgia, Idaho, Maine, New 
Mexico, New York, and Washington); 
 two states (Texas and Oregon) prohibit inclusionary zoning by statute; 
and 
 in 26 states, there is no express or implied authorization or prohibition, 
and authority to enact inclusionary zoning will depend on home rule 
powers, which vary widely, and the particular characteristics and facts of 
the proposed inclusionary zoning ordinance.  
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 58. See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 50, at 21 (describing the voluntary nature of 
inclusionary zoning as one of a number of program features that diminish the effectiveness of 
inclusionary zoning ordinances). “At least three studies have concluded that mandatory programs 
generally yield more units than voluntary programs.” Id. at 23 (citing CAL. COAL. FOR RURAL 
HOUS. & NON-PROFIT HOUS. ASS’N OF N. CAL., INCLUSIONARY HOUSING IN CALIFORNIA: 30 YEARS 
OF INNOVATION (2003); Nicholas J. Brunick, The Inclusionary Housing Debate: The Effectiveness of 
Mandatory Programs Over Voluntary Programs, ZONING PRAC., Sept. 2004; Vinit Mukhija et al., Can 
Inclusionary Zoning Be an Effective and Efficient Housing Policy? Evidence from Los Angeles and Orange 
Counties, 32 J. URB. AFF. 229 (2010)). 
 59. See, e.g., Inst. for Local Self Gov’t, Annotated Sample Inclusionary Zoning Ordinance, in 
CALIFORNIA INCLUSIONARY HOUSING READER 121, 129 (2003), http://www.ca-ilg.org/sites/main/ 
files/file-attachments/resources__California_Inclusionary_Housing_Reader.pdf. 
 60. See ONT. MINISTRY OF MUN. AFFAIRS AND HOUS., LONG-TERM AFFORDABLE HOUSING STRATEGY 
UPDATE: INCLUSIONARY ZONING CONSULTATION DISCUSSION GUIDE 7 (2016), http://www.mah.gov.on. 
ca/AssetFactory.aspx?did=14977 (“Threshold sizes vary across inclusionary zoning programs, with 
examples ranging from buildings with [2] units to 200 units and hectare size ranging from 2 to 10 
hectares and more.”). 
 61. See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 50, at xi. 
 62. See Barro, supra note 35. 
 63. See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 50, at 8. 
A8_MCFARLANE (DO NOT DELETE) 7/25/2017 11:55 PM 
2017] CITIES, INCLUSION AND EXACTIONS 2157 
3. The Financial Costs of Inclusionary Zoning—Incentives for 
Developers 
The most frequently offered incentive is the density bonus.64 Zoning 
ordinances typically restrict the height, the bulk, and the percentage of a 
parcel that can be occupied, which, in turn, ultimately restricts the number of 
buildable square feet.65 A density bonus gives developers the legal right to 
build more square feet than would otherwise be permitted under the 
applicable zoning ordinance.66 
Designing the appropriate density bonus has thus far been more art than 
science. It has become increasingly clear that allowing for taller or more 
sprawling developments can actually cost a jurisdiction more.67 This is due to 
more intensive use of public goods and services.68 These higher administrative 
costs, which are rarely acknowledged and fully accounted for by the 
government, may contribute to financial shortfalls and more borrowing by 
local governments. 
Moreover, design choices often are made without taking into account the 
characteristics of specific development projects. In the Baltimore ordinance, 
for example, density bonuses are made available upon approval by the Board 
of Municipal Zoning Appeals, albeit with no set standards provided for 
approval or disapproval.69 As one Baltimore City Council member ruefully 
noted, there might not have been much significance to prescribing such a 
review process because the Baltimore zoning ordinance typically provided 
uses of a right that gave a particular developer all of the density they need 
upfront.70  
 
 64. See AM. PLANNING ASS’N, MODEL SMART LAND-DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS: § 4.4 MODEL 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING DENSITY BONUS ORDINANCE 1 (2006), https://www.smartgrowthamerica. 
org/app/legacy/images/IH-model-ordinance-APA%20.pdf.  
 65. One example is Baltimore’s Zoning Ordinance, which was enacted pursuant to 
Ordinance No. 1051 in 1971. See Transform Baltimore, CITIZENS PLAN. & HOUSING ASS’N, http:// 
www.cphabaltimore.org/transformbaltimore (last visited Apr. 23, 2017). 
 66. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 5.72–.76 (5th ed. 2003); see also HIP Tool: 
Density Bonuses, PUGET SOUND REGIONAL COUNCIL, https://www.psrc.org/density-bonuses (last 
visited Apr. 23, 2017) (defining “density bonus” as “a zoning tool that that permits developers to 
build more housing units, taller buildings, or more floor space than normally allowed, in 
exchange for provision of a defined public benefit, such as a specified number or percentage of 
affordable units included in the development”).  
 67. See Helen F. Ladd, Population Growth, Density and the Costs of Providing Public Services, 29 
URB. STUD. 273, 291–92 (1992) (“The increasing per capita spending as the density of counties 
rises above 250 people per square mile provides important additional evidence to counter the 
view . . . that higher density reduces public sector costs.”). 
 68. See generally Kangoh Lee, Voluntary Provision of Public Goods and Administrative Costs, 34 
PUB. FIN. REV. 195 (2006) (explaining how administrative costs affect the public and private 
provision of public goods); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 
61 (1986) (exploring judicial deference in public use cases). 
 69. See generally BALT., MD. CODE art. 13, § 2B (2016). 
 70. CITIZENS PLANNING & HOUS. ASS’N, INCLUSIONARY HOUSING FORUM REPORT 3 (2016) 
(“Councilman Henry explained that Baltimore’s current inclusionary housing ordinance has 
produced very few units because a provision in the law designed to hold the developers financially 
harmless has been interpreted to mean that developers must be paid cash from the inclusionary 
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In addition to density bonuses and conventional cost offsets, such as 
direct subsidies, payment in lieu of taxes, or tax credits, some jurisdictions 
allow developers to construct affordable units offsite or allow the developer 
to pay an in lieu fee to the local government’s affordable housing fund.71 The 
theory is that the local government will use those funds to construct affordable 
units elsewhere.72 Although it is difficult to articulate exactly what the 
legitimate reasons could be for this feature other than political expediency, 
this feature permits flexibility in terms of how to comply with the law, which 
is attractive to some developers.73 
4. Social Preferences and Opt-Outs from Inclusionary Zoning 
An underappreciated dimension of designing an inclusionary zoning 
ordinance is whether to include voluntary opt-out or in lieu of options. 
According to Tim Iglesias, a number of inclusionary zoning ordinances do 
not provide these options and, thus, are more easily understood to function 
as “‘pure’ land regulation” by requiring affordable housing units to be built 
as part of a market-rate development.74 These inclusionary zoning ordinances 
are “pure,” because they ensure residential integration (in direct counter to 
exclusionary zoning) while simultaneously producing additional units of 
affordable housing.75 However, the politics of inclusionary zoning is such that 
most jurisdictions do not follow the pure integrative approach but instead 
provide some measure of flexibility with respect to this integrative policy goal, 
which allows developers to comply by paying in lieu fees for affordable 
housing located elsewhere.76 
This means developers utilizing the flexibility device will likely cause 
affordable housing intended for white, high-opportunity areas to be moved 
into less central, nonwhite, low- or lower-opportunity areas because of less 
expensive land prices.77 This offsite development occurs because developers 
 
housing offset fund if the affordable units are to be built. If there is no money in the fund, then 
the city issues a waiver, and the units are not constructed.”). 
 71. See URBAN INST., supra note 9, at 49. 
 72. See Tim Iglesias, Maximizing Inclusionary Zoning’s Contributions to Both Affordable Housing 
and Residential Integration, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 585, 590 (2015) (noting that in lieu fees may result 
in affordable housing units being produced because the land costs for sites where such affordable 
housing is likely to be built will be cheaper). 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Iglesias, supra note 72, at 590. 
 75. See generally Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 (July 16, 2015) 
(to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, & 903) (requiring localities to ensure 
that their housing and development programs actively promote integration). 
 76. See Sweeney, supra note 50. 
 77. See Michael Floryan, Comment, Cracking the Foundation: Highlighting and Criticizing the 
Shortcomings of Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning Practices, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1039, 1097–1104 (2010) 
(discussing the shortcomings of provisions offering developers offsite or in lieu options); see also M. 
Tanner Clagett, If It’s Not Mixed-Income, It Won’t Be Transit-Oriented: Ensuring Our Future Developments 
Are Equitable & Promote Transit, 41 TRANSP. L.J. 1, 20 (2014) (noting that although offsite or in lieu 
options may increase the overall number of available housing units for low-income families, “this 
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would simply prefer to write a check rather than find ways to build affordable 
housing that can coexist alongside market-rate housing.78 It also occurs where 
developers prefer to avoid the inclusionary aspect of the mandate because of 
concerns about the “marketing effects of mixing poorer folks with wealthier 
ones.”79 Lastly, offsite construction may serve as an indirect way for local 
governments to avoid increased “administrative costs” in whiter, higher-
income areas.80 
5. Set-Asides and the Tipping Point 
Inclusionary zoning ordinances also vary in terms of the required 
proportion of units that is to be set aside, built, or otherwise made available 
within a specific geographic location.81 Other differences revolve around 
whether the affordable housing will be leased or sold, as well as the size and 
type of developments to be subject to this regulation.82 An informal survey 
found that such ordinances, regardless of how they are structured by local 
governments, resulted in only a small number of new units, between 4% and 
35% of the total stock being produced.83 
6. How Long Will Inclusionary Housing Remain Affordable? 
Another important aspect of inclusionary zoning is that, at least 
theoretically, it is a type of zoning regulation premised on assuring long-term 
 
approach does little for the purposes of mixed-income [Transit-Oriented Development] and would 
still likely require low-income families to bear greater transportation costs”). 
 78. See Iglesias, supra note 72, at 591. 
 79. Douglas R. Porter, The Promise and Practice of Inclusionary Zoning, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT 
AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING: DO THEY CONFLICT? 212, 229 (Anthony Downs ed., 2004). 
 80. Cf. Catherine Rampell, Who Says New York Is Not Affordable?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 23, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/28/magazine/who-says-new-york-is-not-affordable.html 
(“According to a recent study by Jessie Handbury, an economist at the University of Pennsylvania’s 
Wharton School, people in different income classes do indeed have markedly different purchasing 
habits. That may not be surprising, but once you account for these different preferences, it turns 
out that living in New York is actually a relative bargain for the wealthy. . . . There is, however, an 
ominous flip side to Handbury’s findings. When you look at the cost of living for low-income people 
based on their tastes and preferences, New York’s poor turn out to be even poorer than you think. . . . 
Real estate is most crushing for all but those lucky enough to get into subsidized housing. For the 
poor, it is impossible to unbundle [this] from all the perks that help drive up costs.”).  
 81. SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 50, at 1–2. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 23 (“Set-aside percentages in California range from 4 to 35 percent of the total 
homes in a development . . . . Some programs require that developments . . . set aside as little as 
10 percent of total homes . . . while some require that as much as 30 percent be set aside. The 
[inclusionary zoning] policies we studied applied to developments with as few as five homes or as 
many as 50 homes. A few programs required developments with fewer than five or ten homes to 
either provide one affordable unit or make an in-lieu payment. In Chicago, projects that obtain 
financial assistance from the city must set aside 20 percent of units as affordable, while projects 
not requiring city assistance must set aside 10 percent. The City of Irvine requires at least 15 
percent of units in all developments with more than 50 units to be made affordable. Montgomery 
County requires all new subdivisions with 20 or more dwelling units to set aside between 12.5 
and 15 percent of the units as affordable.”). 
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affordability.84 The units that are constructed are often comparatively modest 
with simpler, less expensive features, thus building long-term affordability 
through the dimensions and features of the actual unit itself.85 Nevertheless, 
in high-cost markets, even modest, amenity-lean units could rent for higher 
rents. Therefore, the developer will often also be required to commit to long-
term affordability by placing a deed restriction (a restrictive covenant 
enforceable against present and future owners of the land) that requires the 
units to remain at affordable levels for a certain length of time.86 Typical 
affordability periods range from less than 20 years to as long as 99 years.87 
7. Critical Assessments of Inclusionary Zoning 
There is significant criticism in the literature that inclusionary zoning 
does not by itself produce nearly enough affordable housing units compared 
to the need; nor does it create true long-term affordability to address the 
deficit in affordable housing units.88 There are also very real and substantial 
questions about whether producing inclusionary zoning units for the very or 
extremely low-income individual is actually economically feasible without 
significant financial subsidies.89 These and other questions have been largely 
avoided since it has been more politically palatable that inclusionary zoning 
results only in providing affordable housing for moderate-income people who 
are not the very poor.90 
 
 84. According to a Lincoln Land Institute study of 307 inclusionary zoning ordinances, “[a] 
sizeable share of inclusionary housing programs requires long-term affordability periods . . . [with 
e]ighty-four percent of homeownership inclusionary housing programs, and 80 percent of rental 
programs require units to remain affordable for at least 30 years; and [o]ne-third of inclusionary 
housing programs requir[ing] 99-year or perpetual affordability for rental and/or for-sale 
housing.” Hickey et al., supra note 2, Executive Summary (emphasis added). 
 85. Inclusionary Housing and Other Proactive Policies, TC HOUSING POL’Y, http://www. 
tchousingpolicy.org/solutions/index.php?strWebAction=article_detail&intArticleID=195 (last visited 
Apr. 23, 2017) (“Many [inclusionary housing ordinances] . . . permit more modest interior design and 
finishing.”). 
 86. Hickey et al., supra note 2, Executive Summary. 
 87. See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 50, at 24 (“Some of the programs in our study set 
relatively short periods of affordability. For example, Denver’s inclusionary housing ordinance 
requires for-sale units . . . be made affordable for 15 years. Chicago and Irvine have set the period 
of affordability . . . at 30 years.”). 
 88. See id. at 7 (“[Inclusionary zoning] policies are intended to add to the supply of affordable 
housing, but they tend to produce small numbers of homes, potentially at substantial cost.”).  
 89. See, e.g., Toshio Meronek, Affordable Housing in San Francisco Affordable Only for Upwardly Mobile, 
AL JAZEERA AM. (Feb. 3, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/2/3/san-
francisco-affordable-housing-is-unaffordable.html (stating that, in San Francisco, “activists argue that 
. . . [b]ecause lower- to middle-income people still can’t afford this [inclusionary housing,] they say, 
cities are effectively subsidizing upper-middle-class people to move in and paving the way for 
gentrification”). 
 90. See, e.g., Alana Semuels, The Artist Loft: Affordable Housing (for White People), ATLANTIC 
(May 19, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/05/affordable-housing-
for-white-people/483444 (“Affordable housing sometimes has a bad reputation . . . . But there’s 
another kind of affordable housing, built with tax credits and city loans, typified in a place like 
the A-Mill lofts . . . . But . . . the lofts are not accessible to most poor families. . . . Instead, they go 
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Regardless of whether the current approach best serves the interests of 
low-income individuals, developers subject to inclusionary zoning 
requirements have typically been required to include a minimum amount of 
affordable housing.91 The idea is that developers are the proper party to 
create additional units because they are already engaged in residential 
construction, and, by introducing greater intensities of land use, their projects 
can and do contribute to higher costs for local governments and the general 
public, especially for many low-income renters.92 Inclusionary zoning also 
represents a rejection of the trickle down, housing filtering approach to low-
income housing provision, which is the questionable assumption that over 
time, higher-cost housing, as it ages, is abandoned by the more affluent and 
is gradually made affordable through the inability to charge premium prices 
for an inferior housing product.93 The reality is that dilapidated housing is 
costly in terms of its health risks and attendant costs imposed on productivity 
and well-being. Also, it is incorrect to assume that older housing cannot be 
renovated or repaired because housing desirability is not just a function of the 
structure but is always combined with the desirability of the location.94 
Within this context, it is unclear whether inclusionary zoning fully 
delivers on its promise. Recent studies, therefore, have tested the relationship 
between inclusionary zoning and public policy goals, at least in specific 
geographic areas.95 Other research asks how inclusionary zoning is 
administered over time.96 A third category of work asks if inclusionary zoning 
 
to mostly to white artists, who have incomes below the median for the area but above the average 
affordable-housing tenant.”). 
 91. See ONT. MINISTRY OF MUN. AFFAIRS AND HOUS., supra note 60, at 6 (“Unit set-aside refers 
to the basic requirement that developers must meet for providing affordable housing units. This 
is typically expressed as a percentage of units in a building that must be affordable.”). 
 92. See, e.g., Greg B. Smith, NYCHA Residents See Little Benefit from Gentrification in Their 
Neighborhoods, Report Shows, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 12, 2015, 2:30 AM), http://www.nydailynews. 
com/new-york/gentrification-doesn-poor-report-shows-article-1.2393396 (“NYCHA residents do not 
feel they are benefitting economically from the neighborhood’s increasing development and are very 
concerned about affordability.” (quoting SAMUEL DASTRUP ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF NEIGHBORHOOD 
CHANGE ON NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY RESIDENTS 77 (2015))). 
 93. See Ira S. Lowry, Filtering and Housing Standards: A Conceptual Analysis, 36 LAND 
ECON. 362, 363–64, 370 (1960) (discussing why the concept of housing filtering is dubious). See 
generally WILLIAM GRIGSBY ET AL., THE DYNAMICS OF NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE AND DECLINE 
(1983) (suggesting that filtering more meaningfully takes place at the neighborhood level, rather 
than individual housing units). 
 94. See Rachel Weinberger, The High Cost of Free Highways, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 475, 481 (2007) 
(“The value of land is a function of characteristics that include improvements on the land, 
potential improvements (what is feasible from an engineering perspective or allowed in zoning, 
for example), location (which serves as a proxy for accessibility to the land and accessibility to 
other complementary land uses), and other endowments.”); Jens Kolbe et al., Location, Location, 
Location: Extracting Location Value from House Prices 3 (SFB 649, Discussion Paper 2012–040), 
http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/series/sfb-649-papers/2012-040/PDF/040.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 
2017) (“[H]ouse prices contain information on the value of the location.”). 
 95. See, e.g., KRIS HARTLEY, CAN GOVERNMENT THINK?: FLEXIBLE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNISM 
AND THE PURSUIT OF GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS 174–76 (2015) (noting that the goals and 
challenges for inclusionary zoning vary by region). 
 96. See generally URBAN INST., supra note 9. 
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distorts real estate prices, especially at the low end of the real estate market.97 
Nevertheless, the literature on inclusionary zoning does not answer a basic 
question: How can a midsized city, such as Baltimore, ensure that inclusionary 
zoning accomplishes what it sets out to do? This question is important because 
it draws attention to how the assumptions about development shape land use 
doctrine. 
C. BALTIMORE’S MANDATORY INCLUSIONARY ZONING ORDINANCE 
In 2007, Baltimore, Maryland adopted its inclusionary zoning ordinance 
at the tail end of the housing bubble.98 A midsized city that lost its economic 
footing as an industrial and manufacturing powerhouse, Baltimore has 
struggled to find its place and meaning at the end of the twentieth century 
and the beginning of the twenty-first century.99 At the time that the city 
adopted the ordinance, office and residential development was transforming 
the city’s downtown and waterfront-adjacent neighborhoods.100 With building 
cranes in abundance, the city appeared to be finally reversing the steady trend 
of losing population to the surrounding suburbs since the 1970s.101 
With the possibility of a new, economically thriving Baltimore on the 
horizon, a coalition of housing and community activists, sympathetic 
developers, and union representatives came together to advocate for 
legislation reflecting a variety of concerns and motivations.102 But mostly they 
were seeking acknowledgment that gentrification and displacement were 
 
 97. Compare BENJAMIN POWELL & EDWARD STRINGHAM, REASON FOUND., DO AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING MANDATES WORK?: EVIDENCE FROM LOS ANGELES COUNTY AND ORANGE COUNTY 21 (2004) 
(finding that there are high costs associated with inclusionary zoning that are not offset by sufficient 
benefits for the Los Angeles County and Orange County areas) with Brentin Mock, Inclusionary Zoning 
Does Not Drive Up Housing Costs, CITYLAB (June 1, 2016), http://www.citylab.com/housing/2016/06/ 
what-we-know-about-inclusionary-zoning-thus-far/485072 (describing a recent study that found that 
“[t]he most highly regarded empirical evidence suggests that inclusionary housing programs can 
produce affordable housing and do not lead to significant declines in overall housing production or to 
increases in market-rate prices” (quoting LISA A. STURTEVANT, NAT’L HOUS. CONFERENCE, SEPARATING 
FACT FROM FICTION TO DESIGN EFFECTIVE INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PROGRAMS 1 (2016))). 
 98. See BALT., MD., CODE art. 13, § 2B, Introductory Note (2016) (noting Ordinance 07-
474’s effective date as July 19, 2007). 
 99. Natalie Sherman, After Decades of Manufacturing Decline in Maryland, Signs of Turnaround, BALT. 
SUN (Jan. 27, 2017, 6:47 AM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-manufacturing-surge-
20170127-story.html. 
 100. See, e.g., Lorraine Mirabella, Blaustein Building Sold to Del. Group, BALT. SUN (Apr. 28, 2007), 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2007-04-28/business/0704280334_1_charles-street-north-charles-
office-towers; Jill Rosen, Harbor East Boomtown, BALT. SUN (Mar 4, 2007), http://www.baltimoresun. 
com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bal-harboreast0304-story.html. 
 101. Natalie Sherman, Baltimore Population Falls, Nearing a 100-Year Low, U.S. Census Says, BALT. SUN 
(Mar. 23, 2017, 12:04 AM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-bz-
baltimore-population-loss-jumps-20170322-story.html (“The figures put Baltimore at about 614,664 
people, down more than 1 percent. It’s now returned to about the same size it was a century ago.”). 
 102. See generally BALT. CITY TASK FORCE ON INCLUSIONARY ZONING & HOUS., AT HOME IN 
BALTIMORE: A PLAN FOR AN INCLUSIVE CITY OF NEIGHBORHOODS (2006) (advocating adoption of 
inclusionary housing ordinance was comprised of diverse group of members and participants).  
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likely as Baltimore became more popular with the affluent.103 The coalition 
advocated for an inclusionary zoning ordinance to ensure that the revived 
Baltimore would grow inclusively and provide a place for both the newly 
arriving affluent professionals as well as citizens of moderate and low 
income—whether service workers, retirees, artists, or the unemployed.104 At a 
minimum, principles of equity and fairness demanded that residents who’d 
borne the dark days should be able to remain in the city in places with access 
to affordable housing in vibrant, amenity-rich locations. Also, market-rate 
luxury housing would not by itself produce decent affordable housing. An 
inclusionary housing ordinance was a modest effort to work towards that 
vision. 
When the city council passed the inclusionary zoning ordinance, it was a 
noteworthy achievement in a city that had been the home of the first racial 
zoning ordinance at the beginning of the twentieth century and was still riven 
by race and class segregation.105 But the ordinance as adopted differed greatly 
from the one that proponents had presented.106 Rather than strong 
inclusionary requirements, the ordinance, styled as a mandatory inclusionary 
requirement, turned out to be riddled with exceptions and onerous 
requirements for the city to fulfill, including that the city ensure that any 
developer subject to the inclusionary mandate be made whole.107 The 
ordinance required that in every residential project with 30 or more units, the 
developer must provide between 10% and 20% of the units to eligible 
households at or below an affordable cost. For those projects receiving a 
significant land use authorization or rezoning, the set-aside requirement is 
 
 103. Coined by sociologist Ruth Glass in 1960, “gentrification” is a term used to refer to the 
influx of more affluent residents into working-class and lower-income neighborhoods, frequently 
changing the existing social hierarchy. The term is contested on many grounds, including whether 
and how such changes result in displacement of existing residents from rising rents, whether such 
changes are simply reflections of market change or are artificially by government and private 
developers, and the role of race and class in shaping the disinvestment that precedes gentrification 
as well as the resulting revitalization. For an introduction to the ample literature on this topic, see 
generally RUTH GLASS, LONDON: ASPECTS OF CHANGE (1964); MAUREEN KENNEDY & PAUL LEONARD, 
DEALING WITH NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE: A PRIMER ON GENTRIFICATION AND POLICY CHOICES 
(2001); Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to Protective Zoning in Low-
Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739 (1993); Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: 
Class Transformation, Concentrated Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 
(2006); and Lance Freeman & Jenny Schuetz, Producing Affordable Housing in Rising Markets: 
What Works? (Sept. 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://penniur.upenn.edu/uploads/media/ 
Freeman-Schuetz_PennIUR-Philly_Fed_working_paper_091616v2.pdf. 
 104. See generally Joan Jacobson, Dismantling the Ghetto: Local Initiatives Attempt to Give Poor 
Baltimoreans a Choice for Housing, URBANITE, Oct. 2006, at 37 (detailing efforts to give low-income 
residents greater choice in their housing). 
 105. See generally Christopher Silver, The Racial Origins of Zoning in American Cities, in URBAN 
PLANNING AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY: IN THE SHADOWS 23 (June Manning Thomas 
& Marsha Ritzdorf eds., 1997). 
 106. See Sherman, supra note 14 (“The design of Baltimore’s law—shaped by 100 
amendments to the legislation first introduced in 2007—also made it ineffective . . . .”). 
 107. See generally BALT., MD. CODE art. 13, § 2B (2016). 
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10%.108 For those projects receiving a major public subsidy, the set-aside 
requirement is 20%.109 For projects receiving neither subsidy nor rezoning, 
the requirement is 10%.110 Under the terms of the ordinance, however, in all 
cases, any residential project of 30 or more units with inclusionary units would 
be entitled to 100% cost offsets either through cash payments from the city’s 
Affordable Housing Trust Fund or through discretionary density bonuses, 
which are available upon application from the Board of Municipal and 
Zoning Appeals.111 Developers are entitled to a cash cost offset even for 
projects receiving a major public subsidy, and the Housing Commissioner has 
the discretion to “determine[ if] the major public subsidy is insufficient to 
offset the financial impact on the developer of providing the [required] 
affordable units.”112 
Although the standard in all cases is seemingly direct, it is actually 
subjective and vague. The ordinance provides that the developer must be 
made whole.113 To explain this assumption further, at the beginning of the 
ordinance, under “Findings and [P]olicy,” the ordinance states its 
assumptions that economic diversity is important, but so is the private sector’s 
ability “to earn reasonable and customary levels of profitability.”114 Thus, this 
provision indicates the city saw its role as one of ensuring that the developer 
was made whole because the inclusionary units were viewed as an intrusion 
rather than a means for ensuring that the city developed in a balanced way—
i.e., to encourage thriving diverse neighborhoods as a necessary antidote to 
the pervasive segregation and shortage of decent affordable housing. As of 
2014, the ordinance has produced 32 units of affordable housing, and “[t]he 
city has spent $2.2 million to compensate builders for the 32 units [that have 
gone on the market] so far—an average of nearly $69,000 per unit.”115 
It may be difficult to pinpoint why the city adopted such a weak 
inclusionary mandate, but the real estate development context suggests some 
possible answers. First, the city had strongly prioritized real estate 
development to attract residents and employers back to the city. Large swaths 
of vacant and abandoned housing covered the eastern and western areas of 
the city. Following a triage approach, the city prioritized development where 
there is a real estate market that can be realistically stimulated. Thus, starting 
from the waterfront and the spectacular Inner Harbor festival marketplace 
redevelopment, development has hugged the harbor and radiated out east 
and to the north and south, with the highest property values now in these 
 
 108. Id. § 2B-22(b)(1). 
 109. Id. § 2B-21(b)(1). 
 110. Id. § 2B-23(b)(1). 
 111. Id. § 2B-22(c). 
 112. Id. § 2B-21(c). 
 113. See id. § 2B-6(a) (“If cost offsets and other incentives are not made available to a 
residential project in accordance with this subtitle, the residential project is not subject to the 
requirements of this subtitle.”). 
 114. Id. § 2B-4(b), (d)(1). 
 115. Sherman, supra note 14. 
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areas.116 These areas were and still are largely white. The areas that have not 
benefitted at all from this development are largely black. The emblematic 
example of the continued privation of disinvestment is the impoverished 
Sandtown-Winchester neighborhood in West Baltimore, where an officer 
fatally injured Freddie Gray following an impromptu police stop.117 
Second, Baltimore has traditionally subsidized development heavily.118 
These subsidies include tax credits, abatements, enterprise zones, direct 
expenditures “in the form[s] of grants, bonds, tax increment financing 
(TIFs),” and other subsidies, such as “payments in lieu of taxes.”119 Critics 
derided these subsidies as being provided “to private developers with few, if 
any, standard criteria for determining public value or benefit.”120 In 
particular, tax increment financing, a form of bootstrap financing in which 
expected future increases in property tax revenues are pledged entirely to 
paying off the costs of a development project, has grown increasingly 
popular.121 From 2003 to 2016, the city has awarded at least 11 tax increment 
financing subsidies.122 In 2016, the city approved the largest deal in city 
history by awarding $660 million in TIF subsidies for Under Armor to build a 
new headquarters at Port Covington.123 The headquarters would be built in 
an unpopulated industrial area, far from where the city would otherwise have 
been making infrastructure investments.124 The Under Armor mixed-use 
 
 116. Greg Scruggs, The Inner Harbor: What the World Can Learn from Baltimore, BMORE MEDIA (Feb. 
8, 2011), http://www.bmoremedia.com/features/innerharborlessonsfortheworld020811.aspx. 
 117. Catherine Rentz, Activists Focus Efforts on West Baltimore Neighborhood Where Freddie Gray Was 
Arrested, BALT. SUN (Apr. 22, 2016, 6:45 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/2165reddie 
2165/2165reddie-gray/bs-md-sandtown-winchester-giving-20160422-story.html. 
 118. See generally KATE DAVIS ET AL., GOOD JOBS FIRST, SUBSIDIZING THE LOW ROAD: ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN BALTIMORE (2002) (analyzing Baltimore’s economic development efforts); 
Maximilian Tondro, The Baltimore Development Corporation: A Case Study of Economic 
Development Corporations, Shadow Government, and the Fight for Public Transparency and 
Accountability (Dec. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=mlh_pubs (criticizing the lack of public accountability for 
development corporations in public redevelopment projects).  
 119. CITY COUNCIL OF BALT., A RESOLUTION OF THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL CONCERNING 
PUBLIC DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDES [sic]—FAIR DEVELOPMENT STANDARDS 1 (2016). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Tax Increment Financing also has become a popular local economic tool in other 
jurisdictions. See Randall K. Johnson, How Tax Increment Financing (TIF) Districts Correlate with 
Taxable Properties, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 39, 42 n.25 (2013) (describing how tax increment 
financing has been used in all 30 townships in Cook County, Illinois). 
 122. Luke Broadwater, Baltimore Officials Declare New ‘Standard’ for Passing Development Subsidies, 
BALT. SUN (Feb. 1, 2016, 8:46 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/editorial/bs-md-ci-
council-tif-20160201-story.html. 
 123. See Luke Broadwater, City Council Approves $660 Million Bond Deal for Port Covington Project, 
BALT. SUN (Sept. 19, 2016, 8:50 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-
city/politics/bs-md-ci-port-covington-council-20160919-story.html (stating the deal is also one of the 
largest in the United States). 
 124. See Rachel M. Cohen, Under Armour’s Slam-Dunk Deal, SLATE (June 20, 2016, 11:10 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/metropolis/2016/06/under_armour_wants_its_port_
covington_project_to_transform_baltimore_is.html (describing the Port Covington area as “an 
underused eyesore”). 
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project is expected to include 1.5 million square feet of retail and 
entertainment space, including a distillery, and several new parks and 
greenways, and over 7,500 residences, most of which would be rental 
properties.125 The debate over this TIF was polarized around undisclosed costs 
of the development as the project would increase service needs in an area 
outside of the path of development and whether inclusionary housing should 
be required.126 
The result of this heavy subsidy has been an ever-growing, glittering 
downtown and ever-decaying outer reaches. Neglected, underresourced, and 
underserviced neighborhoods that are primarily black and lower middle class 
or poor with fantastic architecture and rich history fall further into decay and 
violence. These neighborhoods do not gain any benefit from the downtown 
development and, in fact, likely experience a detriment as custom and 
contract prioritize scarce city resources to address the service needs of the 
areas that have become the white, twenty-first century face of the city.127 One 
public health researcher, Lawrence Brown, has mapped the consequences of 
the investment and disinvestment patterns and has dubbed the disparately 
treated areas the “white L” and the “black butterfly.”128 The researcher found 
that areas dubbed the “black butterfly” are significantly disadvantaged in 
nearly every measure of public health, including TIF policy, food access and 
policing strategies. The opposite is true for the “white L,” which receives most 
of the publicly-supported private investment.129 
This context cannot be ignored in assessing who has voice and who does 
not in property ownership and development in Baltimore.130 Developers 
dominate the way in which development is structured and deployed in 
Baltimore mainly because the luxury development is successfully producing 
profitable, luxury “high-end” places for the affluent to enjoy.131 However, it 
does so in a way that forces the city to pay higher costs to service these areas 
while reaping no increased property taxes even as property values improve 
 
 125. Adam Marton et al., Port Covington Redevelopment Examined, BALT. SUN, http://data. 
baltimoresun.com/news/port-covington (last visited Apr. 23, 2017). 
 126. Id.; see Mark Reutter, Hidden from View: $29 Million in Unexpected Infrastructure Costs at Harbor 
Point, BALT. BREW (June 2, 2016, 2:41 PM), https://www.baltimorebrew.com/2016/06/02/hidden-
from-view-29-million-in-unexpected-tif-costs-at-harbor-point (describing a similar debate over another 
luxury commercial and residential development). 
 127. See Fern Shen & Mark Reutter, A Poor, Black City Supporting Kayak and Boat Slips?, BALT. 
BREW (July 19, 2016, 2:20 PM), https://www.baltimorebrew.com/2016/07/19/a-poor-black-
city-underwriting-port-covingtons-kayak-and-boat-slips (criticizing the disconnect between the 
types of amenities planned for the new development and the dire needs in a resource-strapped 
city). 
 128. Lawrence Brown, Two Baltimores: The White L vs. The Black Butterfly, BALT. CITY PAPER 
(June 28, 2016, 5:34 PM), http://www.citypaper.com/bcpnews-two-baltimores-the-white-l-vs-the-
black-butterfly-20160628-htmlstory.html. 
 129. See id. (characterizing these neighborhoods as “hypersegregated”). 
 130. See IMBROSCIO, supra note 24, at 12–13 (discussing the problem of economic inequality 
leading to political disempowerment of low income city residents). 
 131. Id. at 13 (describing how developers turn economic success into political empowerment).  
A8_MCFARLANE (DO NOT DELETE) 7/25/2017 11:55 PM 
2017] CITIES, INCLUSION AND EXACTIONS 2167 
dramatically in some parts of the city.132 By the time the city does start to see 
returns, the improvements will be old and likely in need of repair. This 
violates the common sense expectations for development—one would expect 
the development to enrich Baltimore’s general revenues and enable the 
benefits to flow to other parts of the city. Instead, there are no expected 
increased property tax payments to city coffers for 30 to 40 years, yet there is 
increased demand for city services, which have not been built into the deals.133 
While the city council was responsive to the demand for inclusionary 
housing, it ended up adopting an ordinance that subordinated the city’s 
power over development to the interests of the developers. Under the popular 
narratives of government dominance and overreach, one would expect a 
robust inclusionary ordinance once advocates started pressing for it. Yet it was 
the city council that watered down its own bill to align with developers’ 
expectations.134 The enacted ordinance was deeply flawed, with numerous 
exceptions that made the ordinance essentially unenforceable. With the 
complexity of politics, finance, and race and class assumptions in the 
background, the city council accepted the popular developer narrative claims 
that the margins on a development project in Baltimore are such that the 
additional financial costs from inclusionary housing could ruin a deal and 
prevent it going forward.135 
The other assumption seems to be that inclusionary housing is a gift from 
developers to the city. The role the city has played in making these profitable 
deals happen is considered irrelevant. Little thought is given to the impact 
the increase of luxury housing in the city has on the city and the local housing 
market. For example, any housing built in connection with a TIF will involve 
an increased demand by high-demand residents who will pay property taxes 
that are dedicated to repaying bonds floated to build the development—i.e., 
 
 132. See Rachel Weber, Tax Incremental Financing in Theory and Practice, in FINANCING 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 283 (Sammis B. White & Zenia Z. Kotval eds., 2d 
ed. 2012); see also Mark Reutter, Is Kevin Plank Getting “Free Money” While The City Takes the Risk?, 
BALT. BREW (July 26, 2016, 4:15 PM), https://www.baltimorebrew.com/2016/07/26/is-kevin-
plank-getting-free-money-while-the-city-takes-the-risk. See generally Richard Briffault, The Most 
Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 65, 80 (2010) (finding that studies are inclusive about whether tax increment financing is 
beneficial or harmful). 
 133. See Reutter, supra note 132 (“Over the next 41 years, [one particular] project will net 
[Baltimore] $1.8 billion in tax revenues, the bulk of the revenues coming after year 2045.”).  
 134. See Jill Rosen, Affordable Housing Bill Passes, BALT. SUN (June 12, 2007), http://articles. 
baltimoresun.com/2007-06-12/news/0706120096_1_affordable-housing-bill-coalition (describing 
the dozens of amendments to the proposed inclusionary housing bill that resulted in the weak version 
adopted into legislation). 
 135. To date, research on the impact of inclusionary zoning has focused on the effect on 
housing prices in general. This literature does not consider the effect of inclusionary zoning on 
the profitability or feasibility of a particular development deal. See, e.g., Antonio Bento et al., 
Housing Market Effects of Inclusionary Zoning, CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES., 2009 No. 2, at 7, 18 
(finding very small increase in housing prices in jurisdictions with inclusionary housing policies); 
Mukhija et al., supra note 58, at 249 (concluding that critics of inclusionary zoning “overestimate 
its adverse effects on housing supply”). 
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the project’s immediate location.136 Local officials may also have been 
reluctant to require developers to accept low-income residents in buildings 
that were intended for higher-income citizens or may have been reluctant to 
seem unfriendly to business interests, both of which could serve as a barrier 
to future economic development.137 
While this story seems local, it is not only so. Apart from the politics that 
may have made Baltimore reluctant to seem business-unfriendly or to require 
developers to accept low-income residents, the way that the Baltimore 
inclusionary zoning ordinance is structured showed, at the very least, a 
misunderstanding of takings law or exactions law. As Part III will discuss, this 
misunderstanding about inclusionary zoning doctrine arises from a doctrinal 
framework that can privilege the concerns of the property developer in a way 
that ignores the reality of the complex relationship between developers, local 
governments and the general public.  
III. THE DOCTRINAL PARAMETERS OF INCLUSIONARY ZONING 
A. INCLUSIONARY ZONING AS AN ORDINARY LAND USE REGULATION 
As a land use regulatory innovation, inclusionary zoning has both a 
settled and unsettled place in land use doctrine.138 Iglesias has insightfully 
observed that its doctrinal place has been largely discussed through litigation 
and advocates on both sides characterize the regulation in a results-oriented 
way.139 Proponents of inclusionary zoning are likely to focus on the doctrinal 
approach that leads to validation of a regulation or statute.140 In contrast, 
opponents will seize upon the approach that best leads to invalidation, 
whether on a facial or an as-applied basis.141 
Thus, a developer challenging inclusionary zoning could allege that this 
regulation impairs individual property rights without adequate justification, 
in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.142 The concept of 
takings can be either physical or regulatory. A physical taking occurs when the 
 
 136. See Weber, supra note 132. 
 137. See Audrey G. McFarlane, Putting the “Public” Back into Public-Private Partnerships for 
Economic Development, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 39, 49 (2007) (posing the questions as: “Is the 
public subsidy necessary as an economic, dollars and cents matter, where the deal cannot take 
place without the subsidy? Is the public subsidy necessary as a signal to the mobile developer that 
the city is business friendly?”). 
 138. See generally Floryan, supra note 77 (arguing that inclusionary zoning is an 
unconstitutional exaction); Barbara Ehrlich Kautz, Comment, In Defense of Inclusionary Zoning: 
Successfully Creating Affordable Housing, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 971 (2002) (arguing that inclusionary 
zoning is ordinary land use regulation). 
 139. See Iglesias, supra note 72, at 592 (“Affordable housing and fair housing advocates might 
agree that the design decisions are a function of politics and local conditions, but may not come 
out on the same side of each issue because of their varied effects on the affordable housing and 
fair housing goals and their possibly conflicting evaluations of these effects.”). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See generally Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974 (Cal. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016) (finding an inclusionary housing law to be constitutional). 
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government exercises its power of eminent domain to take ownership of a 
land or a building.143 A regulatory taking can occur when the operation of a 
government regulation goes too far in impairing an owner’s rights to use their 
property as they see fit.144 Presumably, the belief is that developers have a 
“right” to a “reasonable” return on their investment, so a regulatory taking 
arises from inclusionary zoning’s affordability requirement when it forces the 
developers to forgo some income. Popular belief about regulatory takings 
differ with the actual doctrine, which rarely finds something wrong with a 
regulation that places additional burdens on developers simply because 
developers believe that regulation to be inconsistent with individual property 
rights.145 
The prevailing test for regulatory takings is an ad hoc factual inquiry, 
which sounds more precise than it really is.146 This test, which was announced 
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, asks whether there is a 
severe enough impact upon investment-backed expectations that the 
regulation would be viewed as unjustified.147 A related question is whether the 
regulation would be accepted as ordinary and beneficial to the general public, 
such that its impact may be justified based on the overall benefits that are 
generated by state action.148 
To date, few challenges have succeeded because of the doctrine’s 
deference to state and local governments’ broad police powers.149 Since Euclid 
 
 143. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (“The paradigmatic taking 
requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private 
property.”). 
 144. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“[W]hile property may be regulated 
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”). 
 145. See Tim Iglesias, Inclusionary Zoning Affirmed: California Building Industry Association v. 
City of San Jose, 24 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 409, 429 (2016) (noting the 
role of property rights advocates in the shaping inclusionary zoning debate). But see Stewart E. 
Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 260 (2004) 
(noting that developers enjoy “significant protection against potentially abusive practices by local 
governments” including “[t]he enactment of property rights legislation”). 
 146. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (explaining that the ad hoc test’s three factors raise “vexing 
subsidiary questions”); Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 307, 333 (2007) (explaining that “the Court’s recent reinvigoration of the Penn Central test 
. . . has shed little light on the content of the test’s three factors, or on how to balance them”). 
See generally Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings Test, 118 PENN. ST. L. 
REV. 601 (2014). 
 147. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124–25 (1978) 
(explaining that the economic impact on “distinct investment backed expectations” is one of the 
relevant considerations in the regulatory takings analysis which is an “essentially ad-hoc factual 
inquir[y]”). But see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (finding a 
regulatory taking where the property has been stripped of “all economically beneficial uses”). 
 148. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (discussing the role of “the character of the governmental 
action” as a balancing factor in the analysis). 
 149. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388, 395 (1926) (stating that a 
zoning regulation will be upheld if its justifications are “fairly debatable” and cannot be expected 
to be overturned unless “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the 
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare”). But see Adam J. MacLeod, Identifying Values in 
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approved zoning as a valid exercise of the police power, which allows 
governments to regulate for the benefit of the health, safety, morals, and 
welfare of its residents, courts have largely deferred to zoning regulations 
when analyzing a takings issue even where a significant diminution in 
property value can be demonstrated.150  
The underlying rationale is that land use regulations have a reciprocity 
of advantage, which is to say that while any individual property owner gives up 
the right to freely use his or her land, other property owners also do the same 
in return.151 The touchstone for the standard arises from ordinary land use 
regulation and how courts, before and since Euclid, have treated this 
governmental action.152 What has been consistent is that courts have accepted, 
with respect to ordinary land use regulation, severe decreases in economic 
value—up to over 80% to 90% in past cases.153 This result indicates that courts 
may accept that a regulation is justified, at least in cases where it is beneficial 
to the public, notwithstanding the fact that the regulation may bar owners 
from selecting the most lucrative land use.154 Such deference is considered 
warranted because a court second-guessing whether an exercise of 
governmental regulatory power is valid or invalid would amount to broadly 
applying substantive due process assessments of local planning decisions 
based on personal sensibilities rather than concrete, objective standards.155 
Thus, the strong tradition has been for the courts to defer to local land use 
regulations unless the regulation is arbitrary and capricious, such as when a 
regulation that prevents an owner from making any use of (or getting any 
return from) his land with no discernible benefit or serious justification.156 
 
Land Use Regulation, 101 KY. L.J. 55, 111–12 (2012) (arguing that state courts regularly depart 
from this deferential standard without applying transparent or consistent standards). 
 150. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 
U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (“[O]ur cases have long established that mere diminution in the value of 
property, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking.”); Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131 
(“[T]he decisions sustaining other land-use regulations . . . uniformly reject the proposition that 
diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a ‘taking’ . . . .”). See generally Daniel 
L. Siegel, Evaluating Economic Impact in Regulatory Takings Cases, 19 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y 373 (2013) (discussing the “economic impact” factor in the ad hoc factual analysis). 
 151. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417–19 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(describing the nuisance exception). 
 152. See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645 (citing to zoning cases as the paradigmatic example of 
how much diminution in value is constitutionally acceptable). 
 153. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1064 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(noting that 95% would not be a taking but 100% would constitute a taking). 
 154. See Avery Emison Carson, Comment, Integrating Conservation Uses into Takings Law: Why 
Courts Should View Conservation as a Possible Highest and Best Use, 86 N.C. L. REV. 274, 281–87 (2007) 
(indicating inconsistencies in how courts determine “highest and best use” in valuing land). 
 155. See, e.g., Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(rejecting a substantive due process challenge to an adverse zoning decision as “present[ing] a 
garden-variety zoning dispute dressed up in the trappings of constitutional law”).  
 156. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (Regulations must be 
“clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the . . . general welfare” 
before the Court will declare them unconstitutional.); see also Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 
U.S. 183, 187–88 (1928) (restating the Euclid standard). 
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The Supreme Court has been largely consistent in this aspect of land use 
jurisprudence, although an unresolved tension remains about how to strike 
the proper balance between property rights and the public interest. One 
perspective is skeptical of governments and concerned that collectivist goals 
should not disturb existing allocations of property rights, whereas the 
competing perspective believes that the government is a beneficial steward of 
the public interest and any adequately justified sacrifice of individual property 
rights is part of the social contract.157 This tension has resulted in an effort to 
identify bright-line, categorical rules for when a regulation rises to the level of 
a taking, while also retaining Penn Central’s ad hoc factual inquiry and 
balancing standard.158 
The retention of this contextually-based standard largely reflects the fact 
that bright-line rules quickly became difficult to administer in an increasingly 
dynamic world.159 As a result of this unresolved tension, regulatory takings 
doctrine has evolved into niche areas of protection wherever a credible 
exception to the deferential ad hoc analysis can be carved out without 
upending the prevailing standard of not substituting judicial views for that of 
the legislature.160 If not for this approach, takings analysis would be a subset 
of substantive due process.161 
The question is where does inclusionary zoning fit within the context of 
constitutional limitations on land use regulation. It would seem to occupy a 
very strong place as an exercise of the police power, as a remedy, or as an 
antidote to exclusionary zoning.162 Without inclusionary zoning and its 
mandate for low-income housing within market-rate developments plus 
 
 157. See PETER M. GERHART, PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY 27 (2014) (arguing that 
property law should be viewed through the lens of obligations rather than through the lens of 
rights); see also Eric T. Freyfogle, Private Property—Correcting the Half-Truths, PLAN. & ENVTL. L., Oct. 
2007, at 3, 8 (“Private ownership is sound because it is useful to us collectively as a people. . . . 
[It] is an individual right only secondarily.”). 
 158. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538–40 (2005) (explaining when 
the per se rules and the Penn Central standard are applied); Audrey G. McFarlane, Rebuilding the 
Public-Private City: Regulatory Taking’s Anti-Subordination Insights for Eminent Domain and 
Redevelopment, 42 IND. L. REV. 97, 154–55 (2009) (discussing the use of categorical rules in takings 
cases and concluding that “[r]egulatory takings cases are really about fairness rather than any 
bedrock coherent right of property”). 
 159. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321 
(2002) (indicating that takings analysis is a fact-specific inquiry where per se rules may not always 
be applicable); see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543–45 (indicating flaws in attempting to create a new 
bright-line rule for takings cases). 
 160. See Coniston, 844 F.2d at 467 (explaining the high standard for substantive due process 
challenges). But see Twigg v. Cty. of Will, 627 N.E.2d 742, 745 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (applying a 
multifactor test to a substantive due process challenge, so as to avoid placing the state court in 
the position of judicially second guessing a legislative policy). 
 161. See Steven J. Eagle, Substantive Due Process and Regulatory Takings: A Reappraisal, 51 ALA. 
L. REV. 977, 1005 (2000) (discussing the interaction between takings and substantive due process 
protections). 
 162. See Recent Case, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1460, 1467 (2016) (arguing that inclusionary zoning 
should be viewed as a restriction on exclusionary residential construction); see also Iglesias, supra note 
4, at 5–6. 
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existing zoning regulations that control what can and cannot be built, there 
would likely be no remedy for individuals or groups that externalities, such as 
economic and racial segregation, harm.163 
This characterization of inclusionary zoning reflects an 
acknowledgement that the current land use geography may unjustifiably 
impose costs on unacknowledged third parties to development, especially 
members of racially stigmatized groups who experience persistent economic 
and racial segregation.164 When viewed in this light, inclusionary zoning 
actually reflects a more informed view that concentrations of affluence and 
poverty are interrelated.165 By way of comparison, a mere rezoning that allows 
denser development is incapable of addressing the societal problems created, 
exacerbated, and enshrined by local zoning.166 
Within this context, the “inclusionary” in “inclusionary zoning” is 
intended as an antidote for past and current racial and economic exclusion, 
which is to say that the regulation has an important economic integration or 
compensatory function.167 This type of anti-exclusion regulation also serves as 
a way to stop private property owners from benefitting from a system of 
exclusion that would allow them to pass losses to: (1) those who would occupy 
substandard housing; and (2) their local government that must step in to 
provide for the unmet need.168 Finally, mandatory inclusionary zoning in 
particular operates as an anticipatory response to future attempts to create 
new geographies of exclusion.169 As a result, inclusionary zoning is correctly 
seen as a much needed and valid correction to land use regulation. 
 
 163. See Michael C. Lens & Paavo Monkkonen, Do Strict Land Use Regulations Make Metropolitan 
Areas More Segregated by Income?, 82 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 6, 7 (2016) (arguing that both land use 
regulation and land use decision-making contribute to “the segregation of the affluent”). 
 164. See Patience A. Crowder, More Than Merely Incidental: Third-Party Beneficiary Rights in 
Urban Redevelopment Contracts, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 287, 318 (2010) (arguing that 
residents of low income communities subjected to redevelopment are third-party beneficiaries of 
urban redevelopment contracts). See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN 
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (discussing the 
persistence of racial segregation and concentration of poverty). 
 165. See Lens & Monkkonen, supra note 163, at 6–7 (arguing that segregation of the wealthy 
is as significant a problem as segregation of the poor). 
 166. By definition, a “rezoning” is a change in use that a local government grants at its 
discretion. This state action should be distinguished from other public goods and services, which 
developers and other permit-seekers are automatically entitled to receive. See generally N.Y.C. 
DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, ZONING HANDBOOK (2011). 
 167. See Iglesias, supra note 72, at 590–91, 599 n.4 (discussing how often this is bypassed with 
waivers or offsite housing). 
 168. See FENNELL, supra note 43, at 157 (discussing the possibility of forcing property owners 
to pay for the privilege to exercise the preference for exclusionary zoning). 
 169. See generally Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 (July 16, 2015) 
(to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, and 903). See generally DAVID SIBLEY, 
GEOGRAPHIES OF EXCLUSION: SOCIETY AND DIFFERENCE IN THE WEST (1995) (arguing that 
Western society is fundamentally premised on exclusion). 
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B. INCLUSIONARY ZONING AS AN EXACTION 
Exactions doctrine relies on a different subset of legal principles within 
land use regulation.170 The principles set a standard for how a local 
government must treat potential developers by allowing them to proceed with 
development and only imposing conditions on that development project—
i.e., specific steps or limits on the contemplated project—that offset direct, 
measurable, physical impacts of that landowner’s particular development.171 
These principles arose out of a specific set of land use cases where a local 
government demanded a public easement as a condition for signing off on an 
intensification of land use.172 These principles reflect judicial concerns that 
property owners may often be powerless in the face of certain types of 
governmental action.173 
Under a regulatory takings analysis, a court would have found no taking 
in any of the prototypical exactions cases because the government regulation 
serves a valid purpose and, for the developer, reasonable use and a reasonable 
return would still be available from the property.174 Because the landowners 
seeking to develop were being forced to give up something that was 
considered illegitimate for the government to require them to give up—in 
these cases, access by the public to the property—the Supreme Court weighed 
in on an area of doctrine formerly handled at the state level: exactions 
doctrine.175 This area of law, in effect, protects developers from the 
government if the government requires the developer to satisfy certain 
requirements before engaging in a proposed intensification of land use when 
compliance would mean the developer would be complicit in giving up his or 
her property rights.176  
 
 170. See Fenster, supra note 21, at 622 (“The exactions decisions’ rules attempt to limit 
exactions to a single purpose: the direct abatement of nuisancelike impacts caused by the 
proposed land use.”). 
 171. See generally Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (finding that a condition 
placed on a building permit was unconstitutional because there was not a “reasonable 
relationship” between the condition and the permit); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 
825 (1987) (same). 
 172. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591–92 (2013) 
(swamp land in Orange County, Florida, east of Orlando); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379 (hardware store 
in Tigard, Oregon); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827 (beach bungalow in Ventura County, California). 
 173. See Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA 
L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2000) (“[T]he choice of the word ‘exaction’ . . . amounts to a linguistic stacking 
of the deck. . . . [I]t connotes something done by one (powerful) party to another (powerless) 
party.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 174. See generally Jerold S. Kayden, Celebrating Penn. Central: How the Supreme Court’s Preservation 
of Grand Central Terminal Helped Preserve Planning Nationwide, PLANNING, June 2003, at 20 (noting the 
role of Penn Central as the basis of modern land use and planning regulatory power). 
 175. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 511, 520 (2012) 
(“[T]he commands of Nollan and Dolan represent a more stringent standard of review than most, 
if not all, state courts previously employed in the permit condition context.”). 
 176. See Daniel P. Selmi, Negotiations in the Aftermath of Koontz, 75 MD. L. REV. 743, 743 
(2016) (“Deterring ‘extortion[],’ ‘coercion,’ ‘evasi[on],’ and use of ‘leverage’ by local 
governments plainly motivated the Court’s decision.” (alterations in original) (quoting Koontz, 
133 S. Ct. at 2594–95)). 
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Under this line of cases, inclusionary zoning could be seemingly 
characterized as an “unconstitutional condition” under a mechanical 
application of exactions doctrine’s special requirements of a valid and 
supportable connection between the goal of a development permit condition 
and what the condition requires of a person undertaking development.177 
Under this conception, inclusionary zoning operates as a condition, which 
must be limited to directly offset the potential impacts of development to be 
valid. Of course, an implicit corollary is that a government would be entitled 
to identify all potential impacts and ensure that they are accounted for.178 
The applicability of the exactions doctrine would seem to depend upon 
whether an inclusionary zoning program is implemented legislatively or 
administratively.179 If the legislation imposes a particular condition on 
development, it would mean that the government has announced generally 
applicable requirements that apply to every developer.180 If the requirement 
involves flexible case-by-case implementation, which would seem to be more 
administrative than adjudicative and deserving of modestly closer review to 
ensure legislative standards are met, then a heightened standard of review 
could apply to review of any challenge to the inclusionary requirement.181 
Thus, a valid claim seems more likely whenever a local government adds 
a certain amount of flexibility, through additional discretion, to an 
 
 177. See generally David L. Callies, Mandatory Set-Asides as Land Development Conditions, 42/43 
URB. LAW. 307, 325 (2010/2011) (discussing inclusionary zoning as an exaction likely to be 
unconstitutional without “incentives”).  
 178. See Selmi, supra note 23, at 340–41 (noting that since the advent of the exaction cases, 
the number and frequency of offsets for impacts have risen dramatically). “[T]he expansion in 
the types of impacts that form the basis for exactions imposed as conditions on projects. As 
concerns over environmental degradation have expanded over the last forty years, local 
governments have increasingly responded by conditioning project approvals to minimize impacts 
on a broader variety of environmental concerns.” Id. at 340. 
 179. Id. at 350, 367 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 n.8 (1994)) (noting 
that this distinction is mentioned in Dolan only). “[I]n Dolan, the Court placed the burden of 
proof to uphold the exaction on the city, with the unconvincing explanation that the city was 
engaged in making an adjudicative decision.” Id. at 367; see also Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of 
San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928, 928 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (noting 
the split between lower courts over the legislative–administrative distinction and expressing 
“doubt that ‘the existence of a taking should turn on the type of governmental entity responsible for 
the taking’” (quoting Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1117–18 (1995))). 
 180. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2592 (2013) (noting 
that the challenged conditions were granted by state law, the Warren S. Henderson Wetlands 
Protection Act, which authorized conditions to mitigate the impact of development in wetlands); 
see also FLA. STAT. § 373.414(1)(b) (2016) (“If the applicant is unable to otherwise meet the 
criteria set forth in this subsection, the governing board or the department, in deciding to grant 
or deny a permit, shall consider measures proposed by or acceptable to the applicant to mitigate 
adverse effects that may be caused by the regulated activity. Such measures may include, but are 
not limited to, onsite mitigation, offsite mitigation, offsite regional mitigation, and the purchase 
of mitigation credits from mitigation banks permitted under s. 373.4136.”). 
 181. See Iglesias, supra note 4, at 4 (“[O]pponents might selectively present the developer’s 
situation, e.g. treating a land use regulation-type as a ‘exaction’ by isolating the ‘in lieu fee’ and urging 
the court to treat the ‘in lieu’ fee as an ‘impact fee.’ Moreover, if a local requirement offers a developer 
several options for compliance, there is no clear legal rule directing the court how to frame its review 
of each option or how to interpret severability clauses.” (footnote omitted)). 
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inclusionary zoning ordinance.182 One example of flexibility is when a statute 
permits the number of units to be individually tailored to a particular project 
or when an ordinance creates a menu of choices for either building units or 
contributing towards an affordable housing fund.183 With flexibility comes 
discretion, and with discretion comes the opportunity for the other part of 
land use regulation, which is deal-making.184 
The biggest challenge reflected in this indeterminate area of exactions, 
as opposed to takings analysis, is the reality that it has become customary in 
development for a local government to simultaneously act not only as a 
regulator but also as a dealmaker.185 This dual role has often troubled courts, 
especially the U.S. Supreme Court, because of the varying perspectives on the 
propriety of governmental regulation.186 From one perspective, the 
government is viewed as a well-meaning regulator, who is best positioned to 
assess the needs of the polity and the impact and costs of intensified use.187 
Alternately, the government may be viewed as a rent-seeking and careless 
oppressor, acting in a proprietary, opportunistic, and potentially arbitrary 
way, insulated from any political check by some notion of political process 
failure.188 In other words, the single or few developers are powerless to 
democratically protect their interests because they are relatively few in 
number. As such, the Court has paid increasing attention when a local 
government requires property owners to accede to what are perceived to be 
public needs that, based on an invisible metric, the government should 
purchase rather than be perceived to be forcing an uncompensated trade. 
This perceived need for scrutiny may be especially acute when these 
landowners’ individual property rights would normally entitle them to 
 
 182. Id. at 10 (“[F]lexibility is likely to assist in meeting goals. . . . Flexibility in forms of compliance 
and offering waivers may also help the ordinance withstand legal attacks, but not necessarily.”). 
 183. Id. at 5–9 (arguing that an inclusionary zoning ordinance is, ironically, more, not less, 
vulnerable to challenge as an exaction when it provides alternatives). 
 184. See ELLICKSON ET. AL., supra note 18, at 332.  
 185. See Fenster, supra note 21, at 674 (“Formulaic exactions . . . eliminate[] the inclusion, 
contingency, and openness that might be found in the deal making of political compromise.”). 
See generally Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development 
Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REV. 957 (1987) 
(discussing land use deals in the context of municipalities’ police and contract powers). 
 186. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball & Laurie Reynolds, Exactions and Burden Distribution in Takings 
Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513, 1516 (2006) (“Nollan and Dolan have received a great deal of 
attention from commentators, who can be divided roughly into two camps.” (footnote omitted)). 
 187. See Fenster, supra note 21, at 675–78 (discussing government as consensus builder). 
 188. See McFarlane, supra note 158, at 101 (“The evolution of the ad hoc doctrine of 
regulatory takings reflects an imperfect, yet effective, attempt to insulate private property owners 
from the [perceived] structural inequities of the political process.”). But see Abraham Bell & 
Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2003) (“As repeat 
players in the political process without significant coordination costs, developers generally have 
a leg up in the political arena.”). 
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autonomy and a right to opt-out even if the local government has significant 
justification for the action.189 
Within this context, the government’s efforts in Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission190 could be understood as a valid regulatory effort to 
generate public value by improving the public’s access to the beach.191 
Specifically, the California Coastal Commission sought to create more public 
value by converting the increased intensification of use that would occur due 
to Mr. Nollan’s expansion of his dilapidated beach house into a tangible 
benefit for the public, which would otherwise not have the same level of access 
to the beach.192 In other words, Nollan granting the easement would offset 
the harms caused by his proposed development project.193 
The idea of granting physical access to the most desirable part of a private 
beach, however, seemed to run counter to the Court’s ideas about individual 
property rights. The exactions doctrine announced in Nollan was not 
unprecedented. Pre-Nollan precedents seemed to assume the need for some 
connection between what is asked for and what purpose it is supposed to 
serve.194 The question is the amount of deference that courts should give to 
local governments in terms of evaluating the closeness of fit. Recognizing the 
departure from the deferential standard in Due Process and Equal Protection 
review, the Nollan Court articulated a new standard—a requirement that the 
permit condition relate closely with a legitimate state interest: the “essential 
nexus.”195 
 
 189. See McFarlane, supra note 158, at 138–39 (arguing that the suburbs were created as a place 
to “escape from disadvantage” and this geographical context has shaped regulatory takings doctrine). 
 190. See generally Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that state 
action requiring property owners to give an easement to the public as a condition for the receipt 
of a land-use permit is a taking when: (1) the state action fails to advance a legitimate 
governmental interest; (2) the ceding of an easement is inadequately related to the government’s 
interest in the harm that is imposed on the public (deprivation of the public’s view of the beach); 
and (3) the burden to be imposed on the public did not justify an unjustified taking of property 
by the government). 
 191. The term “public value” refers to the process of taking into account “the benefits and 
costs of public services not only in terms of dollars and cents, but also in terms of how government 
actions affect important civic and democratic principles such as equity, liberty, responsiveness, 
transparency, participation, and citizenship.” Shayne Kavanagh, Defining and Creating Value for the 
Public, GOV’T FIN. REV., Oct. 2014, at 57, 57 (reviewing MARK H. MOORE, RECOGNIZING PUBLIC 
VALUE (2013)). 
 192. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 842 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Commission reasonably concluded 
that such ‘buildout,’ both individually and cumulatively, threatens public access to the shore.”). 
 193. Id. at 856 (“Allowing appellants to intensify development along the coast in exchange 
for ensuring public access to the ocean is a classic instance of government action that produces 
a ‘reciprocity of advantage.’” (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922))). 
 194. See Fenster, supra note 21, at 680 (“Before the Court involved itself in exactions, state 
courts had developed their own approaches to protecting individuals from excessive regulatory 
conditions, and state legislatures continue to control the authority of local governments to 
impose exactions.”). 
 195. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (“The evident constitutional propriety disappears, however, 
if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as the 
justification for the prohibition. When that essential nexus is eliminated, the situation becomes 
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In a subsequent exactions case, Dolan v. City of Tigard, the government 
conditioned a permit to expand a commercial building and an adjacent 
parking lot on the property owner granting a public easement.196 The Court 
further elaborated on the constitutional standard for exactions that it had 
announced in Nollan by requiring that any condition requested by local 
governments must be “rough[ly] proportional[]” to the harm being caused 
by a development project.197 This requirement also has to be narrowly 
tailored, as determined by an “individualized determination”—i.e., an 
individual project assessments.198 
Thus, the Dolan Court reinforced that a blanket requirement was 
discouraged. The local government, instead, has to make some effort to 
expertly quantify impact and that what the government asked for was 
somehow equivalent to the development’s impact.199 Why? There seems to be 
a sense that without the court as referee, the local political process does not 
shield owners from abusive local government. There is, however, some 
common sense appeal to the outcome in Dolan because it seems that perhaps, 
in some respect, the City of Tigard did ask for more than it needed (an 
easement for a public right of way) in order to offset the impact of the 
developer’s anticipated project on flooding.200 The question remains, 
however, why the close scrutiny here and not elsewhere where a deferential 
standard applies. 
The heightened standard of review that applies to imposing such a 
condition, which must be directly related to the impact of a development 
project, is hard to reconcile with the separation-of-powers-based judicial 
deference to legislative policymaking.201 Oddly, Nollan and Dolan provide only 
modestly helpful guidelines about what local government can and cannot ask 
for. In doing so, these cases have helped to advance a somewhat restrictive 
and disempowering view of government regulation.202 This restrictive and 
disempowering view of government regulation, in turn, could provide an 
 
the same as if California law forbade shouting fire in a crowded theater, but granted dispensations 
to those willing to contribute $100 to the state treasury.”). 
 196. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377–80 (1994). 
 197. Id. at 391. 
 198. Id.  
 199. See id. (determining that an “individualized determination” is required). 
 200. Id. at 386. 
 201. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660–61 (1887) (“Power to determine such 
questions, so as to bind all, must exist somewhere; else society will be at the mercy of the few, 
who, regarding only their own appetites or passions, may be willing to imperil the peace and 
security of the many, provided only they are permitted to do as they please. Under our system 
that power is lodged with the legislative branch of the government. It belongs to that department 
to exert what are known as the police powers of the State, and to determine, primarily, what 
measures are appropriate or needful for the protection of the public morals, the public health, 
or the public safety.”). 
 202. But see Fenster, supra note 17, at 731 (“The Court’s exactions rules check government 
discretion only selectively, while leaving it up to other governmental institutions, as well as to 
developers, homeowners, voters, and the market for local governments’ packages of taxes and 
services, to check discretion over exactions to which Nollan and Dolan do not apply.”). 
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opening for sophisticated developers to advocate for limiting regulation, 
especially the general health, safety and welfare of all types of its citizens, not 
only high-income but also middle- and low-income.203 
The Court’s initial rationale for Nollan and Dolan, was that any condition 
that is placed on a development permit must substantially advance a 
legitimate state interest.204 This was conceptually quite appropriate, at least in 
cases where a permit was subject to complying with certain conditions, since 
any honest of assessment of the exactions standard was that it imposed a 
heightened standard of review in cases where individual property rights may 
be impaired by state action. Although this standard was well understood 
within zoning jurisprudence arising out of Euclid as a signal to defer to local 
government policymaking with respect to land use, the Court ultimately 
abandoned it in exactions doctrine to avoid its misapplication elsewhere in 
economic legislation.205 
One result of this revision is that the Court had to make changes to the 
underlying rationale for exactions doctrine. It did so by drawing on a less 
developed area of analysis: “unconstitutional conditions.”206 Similar to the 
exactions doctrine, as announced in Nollan, unconstitutional conditions 
analysis assumes that there will be liability whenever landowners seeking to 
develop are asked to give up something that has little to no connection to the 
harm that their development imposes upon third parties, such as the general 
public.207 As a result, the local government is required to limit its demands of 
developers to mere offsets, in order to ensure that individual and public 
interests are properly balanced.208 
What has not been adequately considered is how the typical 
unconstitutional conditions case differs from land use takings cases.209 
 
 203. See Selmi, supra note 23, at 341 (“[O]nce the Court began articulating the extortion 
narrative in Nollan, development interest groups perceived an important vehicle both for 
attracting the Court’s attention to appeals and for articulating a theme in briefing them.”). 
 204. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (“A land use regulation does not 
effect a taking if it ‘substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests’ and does not ‘den[y] an owner 
economically viable use of his land.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 
U.S. 255, 260 (1980))); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (same). 
 205. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532 (2005) (“This case requires us to 
decide whether the ‘substantially advances’ formula . . . is an appropriate test for determining 
whether a regulation effects a Fifth Amendment taking. We conclude that it is not.”). Instead, Dolan 
sets the standard as being one of measuring unconstitutional conditions. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 
(“Under the well-settled doctrine of ‘unconstitutional conditions,’ the government may not require 
a person to give up a constitutional right . . . to receive just compensation when property is taken 
for a public use . . . where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property.”). 
 206. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547. 
 207. Id. at 547–48 (“[T]he ‘doctrine of “unconstitutional conditions”’ . . . is worlds apart from 
a rule that says a regulation affecting property constitutes a taking on its face solely because it does 
not substantially advance a legitimate government interest.” (citing Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385)). 
 208. See generally Daniel L. Siegel, Exactions After Lingle: How Basing Nollan and Dolan on the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Limits Their Scope, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 577 (2009) (arguing 
that Lingle limits the applicability of Nollan and Dolan to only those permits that require owners 
to dedicate real property to a public use). 
 209. Id. 
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Unconstitutional conditions cases generally involve wholly unrelated requests 
that are made by governments.210 In the land use context, the development 
benefit and its offsetting impact are, in many respects, both a function of 
regulation.211 
Thus, not only does treating these cases the same elevate the ability to 
control property to the level of a fundamental right, even though 
fundamental rights are typically never available for taking by government 
through payment of compensation,212 it also provides an elevated level of 
protection that fails to acknowledge the unique role that government plays in 
dealing with development-induced social problems, such as racial and 
economic segregation; the shortage of affordable housing for low-, moderate-
, and middle- income households; and in encouraging beneficial uses for 
private property.213 At base, the question is whether local government has the 
discretion to identify the loss to the public then negotiate and trade on behalf 
of the public for a right or benefit as an indirect offset.  
In other words, how does government ensure its ability to assure that 
developers fully internalize their externalities that arise from more intensive 
land uses?214 For example, in Nollan, what could the government have done 
to assure that the developer did not shift his private costs onto the public—
i.e., the loss to the public of the view of the Pacific Ocean?215 The Court 
explained that the only supportable possibility would be to require the 
developer to provide a viewing spot that is permanently held open.216 But the 
Court did not seriously consider whether that really would have offset the 
actual cost to the public of the lost view, particularly when combined with the 
intensification of development along the entire beach.217 
 
 210. See generally Peter A. Clodfelter & Edward J. Sullivan, Substantive Due Process Through the 
Just Compensation Clause: Understanding Koontz’s “Special Application” of the Doctrine of 
Unconstitutional Conditions by Tracing the Doctrine’s History, 46 URB. LAW. 569 (2014). 
 211. See Selmi, supra note 23, at 364 (“[T]he lack of underlying cohesion [in unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine] has so fragmented the doctrine that it takes different forms depending on 
the specific constitutional provision at issue—freedom of speech, freedom of association, or here, 
takings.”). 
 212. Id. at 365–66 (noting that a property right is not a fundamental right because the 
government can take it for a price using the eminent domain power). In other words, a right that 
can be bought is not the same order of right as other traditionally recognized fundamental rights. 
 213. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668–69 (1887) (constitutional exercises of the 
police power must be done in furtherance of the “health, morals, or safety of the community”). 
 214. Similar questions are being raised in different fields of scholarly inquiry, including 
economics. See Neva Goodwin, Internalizing Externalities: Making Markets and Societies Work Better, OPINIÓN 
SUR, Dec. 2007, at 1, 2 (“It is very a [sic] positive development that the discipline of economics is 
wrestling with efforts to ‘internalize’ the costs of economic activity that have been ‘externalized’ to the 
natural world. In order to assess the likelihood that externalities will in future [sic] be internalized . . . 
we must ask, first, why have they been allowed to remain external up to now? [sic] and, second, what 
has changed so that we can expect the future to be different in this respect?”). 
 215. See Nollan v. Cal. Costal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 835–36 (1987). 
 216. Id.  
 217. Id. at 836–39. 
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These questions, among others, can only be answered in light of judicial 
concerns about government overreach,218 which have continued to surface in 
the most recent exactions case, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management 
District.219 Among the consequences of failing to answer these questions, 
ideally in the affirmative, is that the U.S. Supreme Court winnowed away at 
the state’s right to negotiate with developers over how to internalize their 
externalities.220 In other words, exactions doctrine fails to acknowledge the 
key role that local governments play in mitigating the cost of key social 
problems.221  
Nollan and Dolan broadly suggest that heightened scrutiny of the essential 
nexus and rough proportionality tests are always required, even for a program 
like inclusionary zoning because a permit tailored to a particular development 
is being issued.222 However, perhaps the better approach is a narrower one. 
This Article asserts that Nollan’s and Dolan’s prohibitions should only apply in 
two narrow situations: The first situation is where local governments fail to 
adequately support their claims, such as when there is no evidence that higher 
than average costs arise from a development; and the second case is where the 
local government uses its discretion to treat similarly-situated developers in 
nonstandard ways, at least in cases where that local government seemingly has 
no adequate justification under the dictates of exactions doctrine’s emphasis 
on impact. 
IV. WHY INCLUSIONARY ZONING SHOULD SURVIVE EXACTIONS ANALYSIS 
As discussed above, at least for the modest number of courts that have 
considered this specific issue, the general view is that inclusionary zoning is 
an ordinary land use regulation that is covered by the Penn Central 
framework.223 Under this view, Penn Central applies to inclusionary zoning 
because what the government requires from developers, an additional 
condition for the grant of a permit, is not tied to the negative effects that arise 
from a specific development. Instead, these generally applicable 
requirements are prescribed in zoning regulations and applied to every single 
 
 218. See Selmi, supra note 23, at 346 (arguing that the exactions doctrine’s underlying 
extortion narrative and it’s concerns about government overreach have extended the doctrine to 
providing prophylactic protection during the negotiation process preceding a taking). 
 219. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2599, 2603 (2013) 
(holding that failed negotiations over permit conditions are subject to exaction analysis 
notwithstanding statewide legislation authorizing water management districts to offset impact of 
wetlands development). 
 220. Id. at 2595 (“Insisting that landowners internalize the negative externalities of their 
conduct is a hallmark of responsible land-use policy, and we have long sustained such regulations 
against constitutional attack.” (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926))). 
 221. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668–69 (1887) (noting that constitutional exercises of 
the police power must be done in furtherance of the “health, morals, or safety of the community”). 
 222. See generally Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 
483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 223. See generally Eagle, supra note 146 (discussing conventional views of the Penn Central 
framework). 
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property owner that meets the qualifying conditions to be regulated.224 As a 
result, inclusionary requirements are not likely to be subject to a successful 
legal challenge. 
Recent litigation in California225 and Illinois226 suggests, however, that 
there is still a real need to consider how mandatory inclusionary zoning would 
fare under a Nollan/Dolan exactions analysis. In both cases, developers argued 
that local governments had exceeded their authority by imposing inclusionary 
zoning requirements.227 If case studies, which methodically tracked the facts 
in various regulatory scenarios were available, then developers could have 
made more informed decisions about whether to challenge inclusionary 
zoning.228 
So, what accounts for the decision to sue over inclusionary zoning? 
Perhaps it can be explained by the poor framing of the issues presented, as 
seen in Home Builders Association of Greater Chicago v. City of Chicago and 
California Building Industry Association v. City of San Jose.229 This framing may 
arise from the fact that the story of development is incomplete, at least as it 
pertains to the costs that individual developers impose upon local 
governments and the general public. The key issue in recent cases is whether 
local government can require developers to provide offsets, in the form of 
inclusionary zoning, at least in the absence of direct subsidies.230 It would 
seem that the short answer, under the applicable law, would be yes. Certainly, 
popular beliefs about regulatory takings, which do not map onto the doctrine 
that actually delimits the use of inclusionary zoning, could help to explain this 
disjuncture. 
 
 224. For an example of mandatory inclusionary zoning, see SAN JOSE, CAL., MUN. CODE,  
§§ 5.08.010–.730 (2017) (providing parameters and requirements for affordable housing).  
 225. See generally Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974 (Cal. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016) (holding that developers could be required to sell a portion of their 
housing at an affordable cost). 
 226. See generally Home Builders Ass’n of Greater Chi. v. City of Chicago, No. 15 C 8268, 2016 
WL 5720482 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2016), appeal filed (dismissing developer’s claim for failing to 
allege an affordable housing ordinance had taken its property).  
 227. Home Builders, 2016 WL 5720482, at *2; Cal. Bldg., 351 P.3d at 985.  
 228. See Ryan Ori, Home Builders Sue to Overturn Chicago Affordable Housing Ordinance, CRAIN’S 
CHI. BUS. (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/realestate/20150827/CRED03/ 
150829844/home-builders-sue-to-overturn-chicago-affordable-housing-ordinance (“The trade 
association and a venture of Mangan Construction & Development today filed a complaint in Cook 
County Circuit Court, seeking a judgment saying that the Affordable Requirements Ordinance—
designed to create more affordable housing—is unconstitutional because it takes property away from 
developers without just compensation. The ARO violates the Illinois and U.S. constitutions, according 
to the lawsuit filed by Steven Blonder, partner at Chicago-based law firm Much Shelist . . . [because] 
‘[i]f you’re going to impose an impact fee such as this, it needs to be tied proportionally to the impact of the activity. 
These two six-flats aren’t causing an increase in the need for affordable housing. There’s no proportionality, and 
that’s really what the problem is.’” (emphasis added)). 
 229. See Brentin Mock, Chicago Developers Are Pushing Back Against Affordable Housing Rules, 
CITYLAB (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.citylab.com/housing/2015/09/chicago-developers-are-
pushing-back-against-affordable-housing-rules/403042 (“The Chicago and California cases . . . 
ask whether cities can force private developers to integrate low-income housing into their 
projects, especially those working without subsidies.”). 
 230. Id. 
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The conventional story about development, as reflected in popular 
beliefs, is incomplete because it reduces the varied experiences of all 
developers to that of the unsubsidized developer.231 By definition, an 
unsubsidized developer is a property owner who does not ask a local 
government for financial assistance nor requires the government to do any 
additional work in issuing a permit. By focusing on this extremely rare case, 
the public is led to believe that most developers are largely unsubsidized and 
undeserving of regulatory attention. In the process, this incomplete story fails 
to account for the fact that developers are never asked to offset all the costs 
of their developments. Thus, claims of government overreach underlying 
their challenges to regulation are often significantly overstated.  
Therefore, in order to tell a more complete story, there are three reasons 
to account for the experiences of the variety of types of developers and their 
varied experiences with local governments. First, this accounting process is 
essential to determining which legal standard applies to inclusionary zoning 
ordinances. It also helps to place such regulations within their proper context, 
as a way to hold developers responsible for the numerous costs they impose 
upon local governments and the general public.232 Lastly, identifying the 
entire universe of developers helps to correct a common misconception: that 
developers give more than they receive. 
A more complete story would take into account three basic situations. In 
the first scenario, a highly-subsidized developer may be given a city-owned 
parcel with an existing use and makes a decision to improve it.233 Permit fees 
 
 231. By definition, an unsubsidized developer is a permit seeker who does not receive any 
government subsidy. For the purposes of this Article, a government subsidy comes in only two forms: 
additional work in issuing a permit and direct financial assistance. See Jonathan D. Epstein, Buffalo Is 
Starting to Lure Out-of-Town Money for Real Estate Development, BUFFALO NEWS (Mar. 10, 2016), 
http://www.buffalonews.com/2016/03/10/buffalo-is-starting-to-lure-out-of-town-money-for-real-
estate-development (“Harvey Kaylie is a bit of a rarity in Buffalo – an outsider willing to join an insider’s 
game. . . . He already owns real estate elsewhere, not only for his company’s facilities but also 
investments in housing complexes in Atlanta, Colorado and the Chicago area, with 600 units in all. His 
surprise bid for One Seneca caught most people off-guard, but he said he has some specific ideas for 
reusing the 40-year-old building. Moreover, he says he has the financial capacity to do it on his own.”). 
 232. In addition to the economic costs that this Article has described, noneconomic costs 
also may arise from new development. Examples of the noneconomic costs that may be imposed 
on members of the general public are social costs, such as emotional distress, due to heightened 
levels of social conflict. See Smith, supra note 92 (“‘The Effects of Neighborhood Change on 
NYCHA Residents,’ written by the consulting firm Abt Associates with help from New York 
University’s Furman Center for Real Estate, found that NYCHA tenants often wind up feeling like 
aliens in their own neighborhoods.”). 
 233. By definition, a highly-subsidized developer is a permit-seeker who receives the greatest 
amount of subsidy. This definition applies when a highly-subsidized developer asks for: (1) a grant of 
government land, a zoning change and government funding; (2) a grant of government land and a 
zoning change; (3) a grant of government land and government funding; or (4) a zoning change and 
a grant of government funding. See, e.g., Natalie Sherman, BDC Considers EBDI, West Side Projects, BALT. 
SUN (Sept. 25, 2014, 10:17 AM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/real-estate/wonk/bal-bdc-
considers-ebdi-west-side-projects-20140925-story.html (“The Baltimore Development Corp. voted 
unanimously in a closed session Thursday to start exclusive negotiations with a developer seeking to 
build market-rate apartments on two city-owned sites . . . . A final price for the land is subject to 
negotiation, said BDC President William H. Cole.”). 
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and other user fees, which are modest payments demanded by local 
governments that give developers access to scarce government resources, such 
a grant of government funds, a grant of government land and other public 
benefits, are the only amounts demanded from heavily-subsidized developers. 
These modest charges, which are often limited to a nominal amount, are 
insufficient to offset the amounts that are paid to, or on behalf of, heavily-
subsidized developers. The difference between what is charged of developers 
and what they pay is made up by local governments, often using funds held in 
public trust.234 As such, local governments are justified in demanding 
affordable housing that is valued in the same amount. Additional amounts 
also may be demanded of developers, especially in cases where their 
development project has an especially negative impact or has recurring costs. 
In the second scenario, a moderately-subsidized developer already owns 
a parcel and decides to change how it will be used.235 The developer, again, 
does not fully pay for the cost of their requested state action, which in this 
case is limited to a grant of government funds, a grant of government land or 
an individualized assessment of the net impact of a specific development. 
These modest amounts, in most cases, are insufficient to completely offset the 
amounts spent in reliance. Local governments are entitled to recover the 
difference in cash or in-kind services as a general rule, as well as any additional 
public funds that it has spent in mitigating the negative impacts of the 
proposed development project.  
The third scenario is the most familiar and involves a situation in which 
an unsubsidized developer already owns a parcel, does not change the 
existing land use, and does not request financial assistance. This property 
owner merely asks a local government to confirm that her improvement 
complies with the law. The permit fee often fully offsets the cost of this 
regulation, at least in cases where the proposed change does not have any 
other negative impacts, which means that a local government would not be 
justified in demanding anything else from this developer. 
This more complete story undercuts exactions and unconstitutional 
conditions arguments against inclusionary zoning for several reasons. For 
 
 234. See Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine and Private Property: The Accommodation 
Principle, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 649, 652 (2010) (“The public trust doctrine has a special role to 
play in moderating development rights because it is, as suggested by Justice Scalia’s majority opinion 
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission, a background principle of property law. . . . A number 
of post-Lucas decisions have confirmed Justice Scalia’s insight that the public trust serves to limit 
property owners’ reasonable expectations to such an extent that loss of their development rights 
does not give rise to constitutional compensation.”). 
 235. By definition, a moderately-subsidized developer is a permit-seeker who receives an 
intermediate amount of subsidy. This definition applies when a moderately-subsidized developer 
asks only for: (1) a grant of government land; (2) a subsidized zoning change; or (3) a grant of 
government funding. See, e.g., Natalie Sherman, Port Covington Developer Asks City for $535 Million 
in Support, BALT. SUN (Mar. 9, 2016, 8:49 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-
port-covington-tif-20160309-story.html (“The city is being asked to contribute $535 million to 
help finance the redevelopment of Port Covington . . . . Plank, who founded Under Armour and 
is its largest shareholder, has spent more than $100 million of his personal fortune to buy about 
160 acres in Port Covington and 40 acres in nearby Westport.”). 
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example, it highlights the many ways that local governments gratuitously 
bestow value on developers. Second, this more complete story points out that 
developers have little problem with imposing their costs on unrelated third 
parties. Lastly, it illustrates that developers receive more benefits than local 
governments ever ask them to pay for. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that additional reforms may be necessary for local 
governments to demand an optimal amount from developers. For example, a 
better connection could be made between the costs and benefits of 
development projects. By expressly making this connection clear and visible 
to all, perhaps through something as simple as creating additional marketing 
materials, it may become clear why more government regulation is needed in 
the form of inclusionary zoning. 
Another option is to undertake better individualized assessments of 
specific development projects. Such a change would require that local 
governments determine the actual cost of regulating development projects.236 
Once it is determined, this cost may be subtracted from a standard amount.237 
The amount to be demanded of a developer would be the difference between 
the two sums. 
There is a potential downside to these two reforms, in that each requires 
a societal consensus about which costs are attributable to each development 
project and how to quantify such costs. This points to an inherent difficulty 
that arises from relying upon measurable impacts. It is a challenge to properly 
account for such impacts, in an objective manner, due to the conflicting 
interests underlying local zoning laws. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Situating inclusionary zoning, properly, within constitutional doctrine 
requires broadening the development narrative to include a wider variety of 
development settings and realities. Cities are grappling with promoting the 
health, safety and welfare of all their citizens by ensuring that well-located, 
affordable housing be built. The current crisis in affordable housing suggests 
many cities are losing that battle, including midsized cities such as Baltimore. 
Cities also grapple with the needs and demands of influential citizens like 
developers, who are not always victims of overreaching government but rather 
agents acting powerfully in their own interests. That public–private 
relationship often involves significant direct and indirect subsidy and 
assistance.  
Any evaluation of mandatory inclusionary zoning must take this reality 
into account. In particular, exactions doctrine’s exclusive focus on 
 
 236. This total cost is equal to the sum of the costs of mitigating the harms that arise from a 
proposed development project, plus the change from baseline for administrative costs in the 
immediate area, plus any subsidies that are provided by local governments minus user fees paid 
by the developer. 
 237. This standard amount is equal to the total number of hours spent in making assessments of 
this type times the hourly rate of the individuals that undertook these analyses, divided by the total 
number of development projects that the local government has analyzed. 
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unsubsidized developers tells an incomplete story about the true costs of 
development. This framework assumes that developers are engaged in purely 
private behavior of little interest to anyone else. Yet the reality is that 
development actually imposes hidden costs on certain subsets of the public, 
such as low-income renters, which are not fully accounted for by developers.  
The predominant view in the United States is that any increase in land 
value is an economic windfall that results from a developer’s ingenuity or luck 
rather than through concerted community planning effort.238 In many other 
countries, however, the relationship between increases in land value, 
community planning, and land use regulation is exemplified by the 
widespread adoption of land value recapture policies.239 Land value recapture 
assumes that new development increases property values but only with the 
social, political, and economic assistance of local governments and the 
general public.240 As such, cities, on behalf of the public, are entitled to 
receive a share of a development’s rising market value. By analogy, the 
propriety of mandatory inclusionary zoning should include some recognition 
that the local government is not seeking a windfall with inclusionary zoning 
but is merely recouping on past and future investments. By clarifying the 
interactive nature of land use regulation, local economic development 
subsidies and investments in private projects, and the real costs of 
development, the constitutional law governing land use regulation and 
doctrine may help cities to understand that they do not need to give away as 
much as they are now so, unfortunately, inclined. 
 
 238. See Nico Calavita & Alan Mallach, Inclusionary Housing, Incentives, and Land Value 
Recapture, LAND LINES, Jan. 2009, at 15, 17–18 (comparing the United States’ view of the “right 
to develop” to the European view that land value increases are “unearned”). 
 239. Id. at 17.  
 240. See generally id. 
